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 ABSTRACT 
Due to the proliferation of hardware Trojans in third party Intellectual Property (IP) 
designs, the issue of hardware security has risen to the forefront of computer engineering.  
Because of the miniscule size yet devastating effects of hardware Trojans, few detection methods 
have been presented that adequately address this problem facing the hardware industry.  One 
such method with the ability to detect hardware Trojans is Structural Checking.  This 
methodology analyzes a soft IP at the register-transfer level to discover malicious inclusions.  An 
extension of this methodology is presented that expands the list of signal functionalities, termed 
assets, in addition to introducing a methodology for matching soft IPs to a functionality category, 
termed Golden Reference Library Matching.  Trojan detection methods are introduced that 
utilize the results of Golden Reference Library Matching as well as internal characteristics of the 
IP.  This methodology is verified using benchmarks developed by a trusted third party. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Motivation 
Many semiconductor manufacturers in today’s world utilize the availability of third party 
IPs rather than create an entire system in-house.  This scenario poses a threat to the system’s 
security as third party IPs are vulnerable to the inclusion of hardware Trojans.  Hardware Trojans 
take the form of unwanted or malicious logic included within a hardware design.  The insertion 
of hardware Trojans allows the attacker to potentially gain possession of valuable information, 
such as encryption keys, or prevent the correct operation of the design by a denial of service 
attack.  Hardware Trojans are often nearly impossible to detect during the testing and verification 
process, as they are triggered by a very specific set of circumstances that only the attacker 
knows. 
The subject of hardware Trojan detection is an emerging field with few viable solutions 
currently in place.  The methodologies that have proven to be more successful involve side-
channel signal analysis in order to determine whether additional logic has been added to the 
design.  However, a hardware Trojan inserted to a design has the potential to be as small as only 
a few logic gates and therefore cannot always be revealed through such analysis.  Therefore, a 
more thorough examination of the design is required to reveal the inclusion of hardware Trojans. 
Previous work published in [10] has been performed in the area of Structural Checking, 
and this research seeks to extend its capabilities.  This method of analyzing soft IPs involves the 
parsing of a design at the register-transfer level in order to create a representation of the internal 
structure of the unknown IPs.  Then, inclusions of malicious logic are identified by comparing 
the internal structure of the unknown design to trusted designs as well as examining the internal 
structure for suspicious connections.  This strategy for detecting hardware Trojans has more 
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advantages than other methodologies currently in use for multiple reasons.  First of all, by 
analyzing the design and detecting Trojans at the register-transfer level, the Trojan threats can be 
prevented early in the manufacture process.  This allows the semiconductor companies to reduce 
the considerable amount of time and testing costs involved in the Trojan detection method using 
side-channel signal analysis.  Additionally, by parsing the internal structure of a design, the 
Structural Checking methodology can detect smaller inclusions of malicious logic that the side-
channel signal analysis cannot. 
1.2  Objective 
The objective of this research is to significantly increase the number of assets used to 
represent the role of a signal to provide differences among designs, as well as to create a 
matching methodology where an unknown design matches to a trusted design from a Golden 
Reference Library.  In addition, for scalability, a hardware Trojan detection methodology is 
developed by using the matching methodology and the characteristics of a soft IP as a specific 
set of benchmarks. 
1.3  Approach 
Hardware designs, written in VHDL, are represented in the form of a collection of assets 
used to describe the role of signals.  External assets are manually assigned to primary port 
signals of the design while internal assets are automatically assigned to signals immediately after 
the parsing of the VHDL design.  Following asset assignment, assets are filtered throughout the 
designs along connections between signals.  The result of the filtering process is a collection of 
assets assigned to each signal, which combine to form an asset pattern.  Asset patterns effectively 
describe the characteristics of those designs, thus they can be used to compare to similar types of 
designs. 
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The representations of designs in terms of an asset pattern are collected and utilized in the 
form of a Golden Reference Library (GRL).  The GRL is composed of the asset patterns of 
trusted designs that have been assigned a functionality.  The asset patterns of unknown designs 
are compared against the asset patterns of trusted designs in the GRL in order to determine the 
functionality for the unknown design.  Following the functionality assignment to an unknown 
design, the unknown design is analyzed for hardware Trojans.  The methodology of hardware 
Trojan detection leverages multiple aspects to determine whether a Trojan is included in the 
design.  The asset pattern, the functionality matching and the characteristics of the register-
transfer level (RTL) code are all utilized in the identification of hardware Trojans. 
1.4  Thesis Organization  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 discusses background 
information regarding hardware Trojans along with similar research performed in the area of 
hardware Trojan detection.  Chapter 3 presents the unique methodology of hardware Trojan 
detection, which is the thrust of the thesis.  Chapter 4 summarizes the results of this methodology 
of Trojan detection and provides analysis for the testing results.  Finally, chapter 5 summarizes 
the entire thesis in the form of a conclusion as well as provides potential areas of future work. 
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2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1  Introduction 
Hardware Trojans must first be evaluated prior to an in-depth analysis of hardware 
Trojan detection via the Structural Checking methodology.  Specifically, an introduction to the 
concept and classification of hardware Trojans is presented in order to understand the threat 
model for the Structural Checking methodology.  Additionally, existing Trojan detection 
methodologies are evaluated in addition to show how the Structural Checking methodology 
advances the capability of hardware Trojan detection. 
2.2  Hardware Trojan Categorization 
Before surveying strategies of hardware Trojan detection, the concept of hardware 
Trojans needs to be explained.  As [1] notes, “hardware Trojans are modifications to original 
circuitry inserted by adversaries to exploit hardware or to use hardware mechanisms to gain 
access to data or software running on the chip.”  As noted previously, many semiconductor 
companies rely on untrusted third party IPs.  Therefore, even if they can ensure the trust of 
circuitry developed in-house, the third party IPs included in the final design are susceptible to 
Trojan insertion. 
Characteristics exhibited by hardware Trojans allow for clear organization of hardware 
Trojans.  The three main categories of hardware Trojans as identified by [1] and [15] are 
physical, activation, and action.  The first category, physical, is broken down into multiple 
subcategories, some of which are self-explanatory.  The first subcategory describes the type of 
Trojan, whether it involved gates added to the design or if gates were modified.  The remaining 
categories are self-explanatory and consist of the size, distribution and structure of the hardware 
Trojan [15]. 
 5 
The second major category, activation, is also described as the trigger for the hardware 
Trojan.  This category is further divided into externally-activated and internally-activated 
Trojans.  In the case of externally-activated Trojans, the adversary alone knows a very specific 
input sequence resulting in the Trojan activation.  Internally-activated Trojans are manifested in 
multiple, self-explanatory forms, such as always-on and condition-based [15]. 
The final major category, action, is also described as the payload of the hardware Trojan 
[15].  The malicious characteristics exhibited by the payloads of Trojans are further divided into 
three categories—modify-function, modify-specification, and transmit-information [15].  The first 
subcategory, modify-function, consists of attacks focused on augmenting the logic of the circuit 
in order to change its intended behavior.  The modify-specification subcategory describes attacks 
intended to adjust certain properties of the circuit, such as clock frequency.  The final 
subcategory, transmit-information, involves attacks focused on leaking important information to 
an attacker. 
The Structural Checking methodology analyzes designs at the RTL and therefore is 
limited to certain types of hardware Trojans.  Specifically, detecting Trojans in the physical 
characteristics subcategory is outside the scope of the Structural Checking methodology.  
Therefore, the hardware Trojans detected by the Structural Checking methodology are Trojans 
found at the RTL within the action and activation categories. 
2.3  Hardware Trojan Detection Survey 
Many Trojan detection methods have been proposed in previous research.  The 
methodologies proposed range from Trojan activation techniques to side-channel analysis.  This 
section gives a brief overview of the major Trojan detection methods. 
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A major technique utilized in the detection of hardware Trojans involves the analysis of 
side-channel characteristics of the circuit.  Two of the major side-channel characteristics of a 
circuit to be analyzed in the detection of hardware Trojans are power consumption and current.  
A foundational work in the development of power analysis for the purposes of hardware Trojan 
detection is presented in [17].  By establishing a power signature for a particular type of circuit, 
the researchers found that hardware Trojans could be detected by identifying significant 
deviations from the power signature.  The research performed in [20] similarly focused on side-
channel characteristics, but limited the analysis to the current in isolated portions of the circuit.  
An additional side-channel characteristic measured the register-to-register path delay.  The 
research performed in [18] establishes a technique for using the path delay measurement to 
verify the absence of a hardware Trojan.  All of these methodologies achieved success in 
identifying larger hardware Trojans, but found difficulty in detecting smaller Trojans. 
Another prominent methodology of Trojan detection involves the integration of sensors 
to available space of a design layout.  The research performed by [2] proposes the sensors 
measuring the delays as a form of “self-authentication” to ensure that a design is Trojan-free.  
This is very similar to the research performed by [3] using sensors to measure the variability of 
path delays, although this research does not explicitly discuss using the on-chip sensors to detect 
hardware Trojans.  Measurements performed by a ring oscillator network measuring power 
consumption on-chip coupled with statistical analysis allow the researchers in [4] to identify 
malicious inclusions to hardware designs.  The methodologies of using on-chip monitors yield 
positive results in identifying specific types of Trojans, such as Trojans described by their 
physical characteristics. 
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An additional strategy of Trojan detection involves the purposeful activation of hardware 
Trojans.  By performing various activation techniques, one can find the designs with Trojan 
inclusions by observing the Trojan payload.  The researchers in [12] employ a probabilistic 
approach to Trojan activation through applying randomized test sequences to activate hardware 
Trojans.  Another strategy of Trojan activation, as presented in [21], analyzes the circuit to 
determine nets that are rarely activated and in turn using test vectors that activate those same 
nets.  A final strategy of Trojan activation found in [14] involves narrowing down the area of 
potential Trojan inclusion to a specific region and testing that region thoroughly for Trojans.  
While each of these methodologies achieved reasonable success, the strategy of Trojan activation 
has limitations since Trojans often require a very unique and complex activation sequence. 
Another category of Trojan detection involves providing greater trust to third party IPs. 
The first of these methodologies, presented in [5], utilize functional vectors to remove trusted 
signals from consideration in order to isolate Trojans to a specific region of the design.  The 
researchers in [6] employ an assortment of methodologies to identify hardware Trojans in third 
party IPs, such as formal verification and sequential ATPG.  Finally, the research performed in 
[7] proposes a Design-for-Trojan-Test methodology that reduces the likelihood of Trojan 
insertion by making potential Trojan trigger sequences difficult to implement.  While the 
research presented in this category yielded positive results, there are limitations to the number 
and size of Trojans that they can detect. 
Additional methodologies focus on the security of third party IPs from a software 
analysis perspective rather than from a testing and verification perspective.  The research 
performed by [8] compares functionally similar IP blocks to determine if malicious logic is 
present.  The procedure by which this methodology compares the two IP blocks borrows from 
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the concept of loop unrolling in order to represent the internal logic states of both designs.  
Another methodology presented in [9] uses statistical analysis to assign values to signals based 
on their vulnerability to Trojan insertion.  The vulnerability values are determined by the level of 
weight assigned to a statement as well as the observability of the statement.  In doing so, a value 
for the level of trust of an entire IP block can be determined.  While the research performed by 
both parties produce positive initial results, more advances must occur for these to be viable 
options for hardware Trojan detection. 
As discussed previously, the methodology of hardware Trojan detection employed in this 
thesis is derived from the methodology of Structural Checking as originally presented in [19].  
Previous work had been done in the area of modeling hardware threats in [16] and subsequently 
incorporated into the Structural Checking methodology presented in [19].  Research performed 
in [10] advanced the Structural Checking methodology through the creation of a software tool 
performing VHDL parsing and expression analysis as well as an initial conceptualization of 
hardware Trojan detection from a Structural Checking perspective.  This research advances the 
Structural Checking methodology further to include a more robust collection of assets, a Golden 
Reference Library for functionality matching and hardware Trojan detection capability. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Introduction 
The Trojan detection methodology presented in this research is derived from the 
Structural Checking methodology developed in [10].  This methodology analyzes hardware 
designs at the register-transfer level (RTL) in order to determine the presence of hardware 
Trojans in the form of malicious logic.  A high-level system diagram for this methodology can 
be found in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1:  System Diagram 
The design in question, written in VHDL, is first parsed in order to create a hierarchical 
structure of the data paths within the design.  The VHDL parser was available as an open-source 
parser [22] and has been developed and implemented in a previous project as noted in [10].  
Next, the primary port signals of the design are assigned assets, which denote the role of the 
signal within the design.  The collection of assets assigned to primary port signals was greatly 
increased from the amount of assets found in the previous Structural Checking project.  The 
assigned assets are filtered throughout the circuit through direct connections of the primary 
inputs and primary outputs determined by the VHDL parsing.  Depending on the assets and their 
locations, the design is categorized based on its functionality by comparing it to trusted RTL 
designs in a Golden Reference Library (GRL).  The GRL feature for categorizing designs was a 
completely new innovation added to the Structural Checking project.  Finally, potential hardware 
Trojans within the design are identified by analyzing the results of the GRL categorization as 
well as characteristics of the RTL code.  The Trojan detection process was also a new addition to 
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the project from the previous Structural Checking methodology.  This entire methodology has 
been implemented and tested in the form of a graphical user interface that allows users to analyze 
a potentially malicious design for hardware Trojans.  The tool produces output reports that 
present the results of hardware Trojan detection for user readability. 
3.2  Assets 
The concept of an asset was previously introduced in [10].  As [10] explains, an asset 
describes the purpose of a signal within a design.  This concept is a foundation of Trojan 
detection, as it allows for signals to be represented in terms of a collection of assets.  A signal’s 
collection of assets will become important in later sections when dealing with Trojan detection. 
Assets can be divided into two broad categories.  The first category is termed internal 
assets.  Primary port signals and internal signals both receive internal assets via automatic 
assignments.  These assets are termed internal due to the fact that they refer to the way the 
signals are internally used within a system.  The other category of assets is termed external 
assets.  External assets are manually assigned to the primary port signals of a design. 
3.2.1  Internal Assets 
The first category of assets, internal assets, includes a set of assets that are automatically 
assigned to all signals within the designs.  The assignment of internal assets occurs following the 
parsing of the RTL code by first looping through the code and searching for all logical 
expressions.  The signals used in each logical expression are then identified and assigned an 
internal asset based on the role that it plays within the expression.  Table 1 below shows a list of 
the 16 internal assets that have been developed along with a description of each asset. 
TABLE 1:  Internal Assets 
Asset Description 
PROCESS_SENSITIVE Assigned to a signal contained within a process 
sensitivity list. 
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TABLE 1:  Internal Assets (Cont.) 
Asset Description 
PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE Assigned to a signal being modified within a process 
statement. 
CONDITIONAL_DRIVING Assigned to a signal contained within a conditional 
statement. 
CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN Assigned to a signal being modified within a 
conditional statement. 
CONCURRENT_DRIVING Assigned to a signal driving another signal via a 
concurrent statement. 
CONCURRENT_DRIVEN Assigned to a signal being driven by another signal 
via a concurrent statement. 
CC_OPERATION_OR Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing an OR operation. 
CC_OPERATION_AND Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing an AND operation. 
CC_OPERATION_XOR Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing an XOR operation. 
CC_OPERATION_NOR Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing a NOR operation. 
CC_OPERATION_NAND Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing a NAND operation. 
CC_OPERATION_XNOR Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing an XNOR operation. 
CC_OPERATION_NOT Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing a NOT operation. 
CC_OPERATION_A_ADD Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing an addition operation. 
CC_OPERATION_MULT Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement performing a multiplication operation. 
CC_OPERATION_SENSITIVE Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent 
statement using another type of logic than the types 
previously listed. 
 
The assets above can be broken down into three categories.  The first category deals with 
assets assigned to signals used in process statements.  Certain internal assets are assigned to 
signals based on whether the signal appears in a process sensitivity list or whether it is used 
inside the process itself.  The second category deals with assets assigned to signals used in 
conditional statements.  Similarly to the assets dealing with process statements, conditional 
assets can be assigned to signals found within a conditional statement or to signals being 
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modified within a conditional statement.  Finally, numerous assets are assigned to signals being 
used within concurrent statements.  These assets are assigned based on the logic used within the 
concurrent statement.  As a signal can be used in multiple types of expressions in RTL code, 
multiple internal assets can be assigned to a signal. 
3.2.2  External Assets 
The second category of assets is external assets, and these assets are manually assigned to 
primary port signals.  As opposed to internal assets that describe how a signal is used internally 
in the RTL code, external assets describe how a primary port signal is used.  There are a total of 
51 external assets that are distributed among several broad categories. 
The first category contains assets describing data signals.  Table 2 below shows the assets 
within this category along with the definition of the specific asset. 
TABLE 2:  Data Assets 
Asset Description 
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL Assigned to data signals within ALUs, adder, multipliers, etc. 
DATA_MEMORY Assigned to data signals being stored in memory. 
DATA_PERIPHERAL Assigned to data signals being used by peripheral units. 
DATA_COMMUNICATION Assigned to data signals being used for communication 
purposes by communication units. 
DATA_ENCRYPTION Assigned to data signals being used being encrypted by 
encryption units. 
DATA_SENSITIVE This is the most general of the data assets and can be assigned 
to signals containing data that does not fit any other category. 
 
The second category consists of assets related to the timing of a system.  Table 3 below 
shows the assets within this category along with the definition of the specific asset. 
TABLE 3:  Timing Assets 
Asset Description 
SYSTEM_TIMING Assigned to the primary clock signal. 
SUBSYSTEM_TIMING Assigned to a subsystem clock signal. 
STATUS Assigned to a signal indicating the status of the system. 
DONE Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is finished. 
HOLD Assigned to a signal indicating to hold an operation. 
READY Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is ready. 
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TABLE 3:  Timing Assets (Cont.) 
Asset Description 
BUSY Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is busy. 
COUNT Assigned to a signal used as a counter. 
WAIT Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation must wait. 
TIMER_CONTROL Assigned to a signal controlling a timer. 
CLOCK_CONTROL Assigned to a signal controlling the primary or subsystem clock. 
 
The next category involves assets assigned to signals used for system control.  Table 4 
below shows the assets within this category along with the definition of the specific asset. 
TABLE 4:  System Control Assets 
Asset Description 
SET Assigned to a signal used to set a value. 
RESET Assigned to a signal used to reset a value. 
READ Assigned to a signal used to perform a read operation. 
WRITE Assigned to a signal used to perform a write operation. 
SELECT Assigned to a signal used to perform a select operation. 
EXECUTE Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is to be executed. 
LOAD Assigned to a signal indicating that a value is to be loaded. 
MODE Assigned to a signal indicating the mode of an operation. 
ENABLE Assigned to a signal used to perform an enable operation. 
HANDSHAKING Assigned to a signal used in communication by way of a 
handshaking operation. 
SHIFT Assigned to a signal indicating that a shift operation is to occur. 
INSTRUCTION Assigned to a signal used as an instruction. This is the most general 
form of this asset and should only be used when a more specific 
asset does not describe the signal. 
SYSTEM_CONTROL Assigned to a signal that is used in system control. This is the most 
general system control asset and should only be used when a more 
specific asset does not describe the signal. 
 
The next category of assets is a subset of the previous category of system control assets.  
These assets are specific to a certain type of subsystem.  Table 5 below shows the assets within 
this category along with the definition of the specific asset. 
TABLE 5:  Specific System Control Assets 
Asset Description 
MEMORY_OP Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within 
a memory subsystem. 
DATA_OP Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within 
a subsystem dealing with data. 
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TABLE 5:  Specific System Control Assets (Cont.) 
Asset Description 
INTERRUPT_OP Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within 
an interrupt unit subsystem. 
PROGRAM_COUNTER_OP Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within 
a program counter. 
INTERRUPT_CONTROL Assigned to a signal used as system control within an 
interrupt unit subsystem. 
PERIPHERAL_CONTROL Assigned to a signal used as system control within a 
peripheral subsystem. 
REGISTER_FILE_CONTROL Assigned to a signal used as system control within a 
register file subsystem. 
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL Assigned to a signal used as system control within a 
communication subsystem. 
COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL Assigned to a signal used to handle a protocol within a 
communication subsystem. 
COMMUNICATION_STATUS Assigned to a signal indicating the status of an operation 
within a communication subsystem. 
INTERRUPT Assigned to a signal used to handle an interrupt requests. 
 
The final category of assets is simply a miscellaneous category.  These assets do not 
clearly fit into any one category and are therefore grouped together in the miscellaneous 
category.  Table 6 below shows the assets within this category along with the definition of the 
specific asset. 
TABLE 6:  Miscellaneous Assets 
Asset Description 
CRITICAL Assigned to an asset that could lead to harm if an attacker gained 
possession of it. 
COMPONENT Assigned to an asset that refers to another component of a 
system. 
ADDRESS_SENSITIVE Assigned to an asset that describes the address used in a memory 
subsystem. 
CONSTANT Assigned to a signal that describes a value to be used as a 
constant. 
KEY Assigned to a signal used as an encryption key in an encryption 
unit. 
REGISTER Assigned to a signal used to handle data to be used in a register 
file subsystem. 
PROGRAM_COUNTER Assigned to a signal used as the value being manipulated within 
a program counter. 
ERROR_HANDLING Assigned to a signal that performs error handling. 
EXCEPTION_HANDLING Assigned to a signal that performs error handling. 
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TABLE 6:  Miscellaneous Assets (Cont.) 
Asset Description 
STATE Assigned to a signal that tracks the state of system. 
 
3.2.3  Asset Assignment 
As mentioned in the previous section, users assign external assets to the primary port 
signals of a design.  This requires the user to understand how the signal of a design is used in the 
system.  Oftentimes, the choice of external asset is very simple, as there is a direct correlation 
between the external asset to be assigned and the signal it is assigned to.  However, there are 
cases in which the user must deduce the external asset to be used based on the closest match to 
the functionality of the signal.  Therefore, several rules should be considered when assigning 
assets. 
First of all, the most important rule in assigning external assets is that the most specific 
asset appropriately describing the signal should be assigned.  As the descriptions of the assets in 
the previous section show, there are certain assets that are general in nature, such as 
DATA_SENSITIVE and SYSTEM_CONTROL.  These assets should only be assigned in the case 
that no other assets best describe the functionality of a signal.  For instance, when considering 
the assignment of an asset to a data signal in an ALU, the more specific external asset 
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL should be used rather than the general DATA_SENSITIVE asset.  
Additionally, if there is not an exact asset describing a signal’s role within the system but there is 
an asset functionally similar to the signal under consideration, then that asset should be assigned.  
For example, when considering the asset assignment of a clear signal, the functionally similar 
asset, RESET, should be assigned to the clear signal. 
The second rule to consider when assigning assets involves the number of assets assigned 
to a signal.  Primary port signals can have multiple assets assigned to the same signal in the case 
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the signal cannot be appropriately described by a single asset.  For example, a signal may be 
used to perform read/write operations.  In that case, both the READ and WRITE assets should be 
assigned to the signal in order to appropriately describe its functionality.  However, the ideal 
scenario is that a single asset can be assigned that appropriately describes the functionality of 
that signal.  This is especially important when considering the first rule above stating that the 
most specific asset to describe a signal should be used.  For example, if a signal is a data signal 
within a communication unit, only the DATA_COMMUNICATION asset should be assigned, 
rather than additionally assigning another data asset that may only partially describe the 
functionality of the signal. 
The final rule to consider when assigning assets involves asset assignment for system 
specific assets.  This rule is similar to the first in that it requires a user to assign the most specific 
asset possible to describe a signal.  More specifically, this rule involves assigning assets specific 
to a type of system if the functionality of the system is known.  For example, if an asset is used 
as an instruction within an ALU, the general INSTRUCTION asset should not be assigned.  
Instead, the more system-specific asset DATA_OP should be assigned.  Even in the case that an 
asset describes the functionality of the signal, the system specific asset should be used.  For 
example, if a read signal is being analyzed in memory unit, the MEMORY_OP asset should be 
chosen rather than the READ asset.  The assignment of system-specific assets aids in the future 
step of functionality matching. 
3.2.4  Asset Filtering 
Following the VHDL parsing and assignment of assets, the next step in the process is to 
filter the assets throughout the circuit.  This involves passing the assets previously assigned to 
the primary port signals to lower level signals based on the internal connections of the circuit.  
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For example, if a primary input port signal directly drives an internal signal via a concurrent 
statement, the internal signal would receive the assets assigned to the input signal.  Filtering 
occurs both from input to output and vice versa, meaning that assets can be passed from input to 
output and from output to input.  This process is repeated recursively until every connection 
within the circuit has been reached.  At this point, every signal within the circuit has been 
populated with assets that describe all possible functionalities of the signal.  The information 
necessary to filter the assets is collected during the VHDL parsing.  The development of the 
methodology and implementation of asset filtering was previously described by [10]. 
3.2.5  Asset Optimization 
An additional step following the filtering of assets through the circuit, termed asset 
optimization, occurs in order to ensure a precise asset pattern.  Asset optimization involves the 
analysis of each individual port signal’s external and internal assets to ensure that there are no 
redundant assets.  As past analysis of asset filtering has shown, asset patterns for large designs 
can be extremely large, resulting in every signal essentially having the exact same asset pattern.  
Asset optimization corrects this issue by removing filtered assets that do not actually contribute 
to the functionality of the circuit. 
Asset optimization is only performed on the primary port signals of the circuit that have 
been assigned assets.  The internal assets of these signals are then analyzed to determine if the 
signal in question is driving another signal or being driven by a signal.  Certain assets are 
removed based on whether the signal is driving another signal or being driven by another signal.  
In the case of the signal being driven by another signal and the original signal contains a data 
asset, the system control assets relevant to data operations are removed.  For example, if a data 
signal assigned a DATA_MEMORY asset has received a MEMORY_OP asset during the filtering 
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process, the MEMORY_OP asset is removed from the collection of assets assigned to the data 
signal.  Conversely, in the case that a signal is driving another signal and the original signal 
contains a system control asset, the data assets relevant to the system control operations are 
removed.  For example, if a system control signal assigned a MEMORY_OP asset has received a 
DATA_MEMORY asset during the filtering process, the DATA_MEMORY asset is removed from 
the collection of assets assigned to the system control signal.  This process allows the true 
functionality of the signal to represented with assets rather than allowing the filtered assets to 
distort the functionality of the signal. 
There are also certain optimizations that are performed regardless of whether the signal is 
driving or being driven by another signal.  As mentioned previously there are certain assets that 
are very general in nature, such as DATA_SENSITIVE and SYSTEM_CONTROL.  In the case 
where one of these assets is present and other more specific assets are present, the general assets 
are removed.  For example, in the case that a signal is assigned a DATA_COMPUTATIONAL 
asset and a DATA_SENSITIVE asset is filtered to the signal, the DATA_SENSITIVE asset will be 
removed from the signal’s collection of assets.  However, it is important to note that only filtered 
assets can be removed through optimization while the assigned assets are permanent.  The entire 
process of asset optimization is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2:  Asset Optimization Diagram	
3.2.6  Asset Pattern 
The results of the filtering and optimizing of assets is termed an asset pattern.  Asset 
patterns describe the system in terms of a collection of internal and external assets that have been 
filtered throughout the circuit.  This is accomplished by listing the internal and external assets 
that have been assigned to individual signals.  The collection of assets assigned to a specific 
signal is termed an asset trace.  The collection of asset traces forms an asset pattern for a system. 
Asset traces originate from the external assets that are manually assigned to a signal and 
the internal assets that are automatically assigned to a signal.  Once the assets have been filtered 
throughout the circuit, each individual signal contains a collection of assets that have been 
assigned initially as well as assets that have been filtered to the signal.  Each asset within the 
asset trace is unique.  This means that the asset traces do not repeat assets even in the case that an 
asset has been both assigned and filtered to the signal.  Additionally, each signal has both an 
external asset trace as well as an internal asset trace.  An example of an external asset trace found 
in a communication unit can be seen below: 
[DATA_COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL] 
An example of an internal asset trace can be seen below: 
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[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
Both of these examples show the list of external and internal assets that were both assigned and 
filtered to a signal. 
Asset traces are grouped into six separate categories based on the type of assets being 
assigned and the type of signals the assets are being assigned to.  The two types of assets are 
internal and external, while the types of signals that the assets are being assigned to are primary 
input/output signals and internal signals.  Therefore, the categories can be seen in Table 7 below: 
TABLE 7:  Types of Asset Patterns 
Asset Pattern Type Description 
input port signal external asset pattern Collection of external asset traces assigned to top 
level input port signals 
output port signal external asset pattern Collection of external asset traces assigned to top 
level output port signals 
internal signal external asset pattern Collection of external asset traces assigned to 
internal signals 
input port signal internal asset pattern Collection of internal asset traces assigned to top 
level input port signals 
output port signal internal asset pattern Collection of internal asset traces assigned to top 
level output port signals 
internal signal internal asset pattern Collection of internal asset traces assigned to 
internal port signals 
 
The combination of these six sets of asset traces forms the asset pattern of a single circuit.  
The asset pattern represents the unique combination of assets that are used to describe a circuit 
design.  An example of an asset pattern of a SPI module can be seen below in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3:  SPI Module Asset Pattern 
As is indicated in this asset pattern, many of the assets are related to communication.  It 
could then be inferred that the circuit described by this asset pattern belongs to the category of 
communication without the previous knowledge that it is a SPI module.  This fact will be used in 
future sections to match asset patterns to functionalities. 
3.2.7.  Asset Pattern Functionality 
Following the creation of an asset pattern for a system, a functionality is assigned to the 
design.  As the name implies, the functionality assignment is intended to effectively describe the 
purpose of the design.  Table 8 below lists the types of functionalities that the design could be 
assigned to. 
TABLE 8:  Functionalities 
Functionality Description 
SHIFT_REGISTER Assigned to a circuit being used to shift data in and out. 
INTERRUPT_UNIT Assigned to a circuit handling interrupt requests. 
COMMUNICATION Assigned to a circuit handling communication. 
ENCRYPTION_UNIT Assigned to a circuit being used to encrypt or decrypt data. 
 
[SYSTEM_TIMING] 
[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
[RESET] 
[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL] 
[CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
[READ, WRITE] 
[ADDRESS_SENSITIVE] 
[DATA_COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL] 
[DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN] 
[INTERRUPT] 
[SUBSYSTEM_TIMING] 
[CONCURRENT_DRIVEN] 
[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL] 
[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL] 
[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN] 
[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
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TABLE 8:  Functionalities (Cont.) 
Functionality Description 
COMPUTATIONAL Assigned to a circuit being used to manipulate data, such as an 
ALU, adder or multiplier 
TIMING Assigned to a circuit responsible for controlling the timing of a 
system. 
CONTROL_GENERATION Assigned to a circuit used to handle system control. 
REGISTER_FILE Assigned to a circuit used to store data 
PERIPHERAL Assigned to a circuit handling peripherals other than 
communication. 
DECODER_ENCODER Assigned to a circuit used to encode or decode data. 
 
As the list indicates, many functionalities have direct correlations to assets that were 
presented previously.  This was intentional, as this aids in determining the functionality of a 
particular design. 
3.3  Golden Reference Library 
The asset patterns generated by asset assignment and filtering are essential in the analysis 
of unknown designs.  A Golden Reference Library (GRL) is formed by obtaining asset patterns 
from trusted IPs that in turn can be used to compare against unknown IPs to determine their level 
of trust.  The GRL contains files with characteristics of the individual designs that have been 
deemed to be trusted.  The unknown design is then compared to the GRL designs and assigned a 
functionality based on the closest GRL design match.  The resulting data is outputted in user-
readable format. 
3.3.1  Golden Reference Library Creation and Characteristics 
The Golden Reference Library was created by first obtaining trusted designs for each 
type of functionality.  The asset pattern for each of the trusted designs are generated and added to 
the GRL to be used as the golden references.  Due to the fact that these are the basis of matching 
unknown designs, a sufficient amount of trusted designs for each category must be chosen in 
order to guarantee that an unknown design could match sufficiently to a trusted design or else be 
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deemed untrusted.  Obtaining designs for the GRL is an ongoing process as more trusted designs 
can always be added to represent more types of designs.  However, the designs currently present 
in the GRL are sufficient to match many unknown designs. 
The trusted designs were obtained through numerous sources.  The main source of 
designs was the website OpenCores [13], an open-source repository for hardware designs.  Many 
of their trusted designs were incorporated into the GRL.  The remaining trusted designs were 
either collected from additional online repositories or were simply created during the course of 
the project.  One potential issue that arose when creating the GRL is that there are numerous 
ways to implement designs of a specific category, and it is impossible to find and implement all 
possible designs.  However, this issue is addressed by the addition of assets specific to a 
functionality as well as allowing the GRL to be constantly updated with new designs.  The 
specific assets allow designs to be matched with functionalities closely related to those assets. 
GRL files contain several important characteristics used in the matching process.  The 
main information used in this process is the complete asset pattern for that design.  In order for 
the asset pattern to be parsed by the tool, certain delimiters were used to identify the specific 
portions of the asset pattern.  The delimiters for each type of asset pattern can be seen in Table 9 
below. 
TABLE 9:  Asset Pattern Delimiters 
Asset Pattern Type Delimiter 
input port signal external asset pattern > 
output port signal external asset pattern < 
internal signal external asset pattern / 
input port signal internal asset pattern >* 
output port signal internal asset pattern <* 
internal signal internal asset pattern /* 
 
As the table shows, the addition of the symbol ‘*’ indicates that an asset pattern is an 
internal asset pattern, while the absence of that symbol indicates that it is an external asset 
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pattern.  An example asset pattern with delimiters inserted can be seen in Figure 4 below.  This 
figure is the same asset pattern as the SPI module from before with delimiters. 
 
Figure 4:  SPI Module Asset Pattern with Delimiters 
The asset patterns generated by the asset filtering process are stored in files termed GRL 
files with a “.grl” extension.  Each GRL file is stored under the Golden Reference Library 
directory.  This directory is located such that it is easily found in order to be used later in the 
GRL matching process.  If additional trusted designs were generated by the asset filtering 
process, the associated GRL file could simply be added to this directory. 
3.3.2  Golden Reference Library Matching 
The creation of the Golden Reference Library is used as the basis for matching unknown 
designs to a functionality.  Functionality matching is necessary for determining the level of trust 
to be assigned to the unknown design.  Therefore, a matching methodology was developed that 
allows the unknown design to be matched to a known design in the GRL.  The asset patterns of 
the trusted designs found within GRL files provided a characteristic to be used for comparison 
>[SYSTEM_TIMING] 
>*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
>[RESET] 
>[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL] 
>*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
>[READ, WRITE] 
>[ADDRESS_SENSITIVE] 
>[DATA_COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL] 
<[DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
<*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN] 
<[INTERRUPT] 
<[SUBSYSTEM_TIMING] 
<*[CONCURRENT_DRIVEN] 
<[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
<[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL] 
<[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL] 
/*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN] 
/[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
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between the unknown designs and the trusted designs.  However, many factors of the asset 
patterns must be analyzed in order to create an algorithm for matching.  This section discusses 
the various characteristics of the GRL matching algorithm along with examples of how portions 
of unknown designs would be matched to trusted designs in the GRL. 
3.3.2.1  GRL Matching Algorithm 
As discussed in previous sections, the asset pattern generated by asset filtering contains 
six separate characteristics based on the type of signal (input and output port signals and internal 
signals) and the type of asset (internal and external).  Therefore, during the matching of asset 
patterns, each characteristic is analyzed and matched to a potential design.  As Figure 5 below 
indicates, the beginning of the matching process is to loop through each entry of the GRL in 
order to compare the characteristics of each GRL entry to the unknown design.  Each 
characteristic is analyzed individually and assigned a percentage match that is then used to 
determine the total match. 
Figure 5:  Golden Reference Library Matching High-Level Diagram 
The match percentage of each individual characteristic is contained in a hash map using 
the name of the GRL entry as the key and the match percentage as the value.  There are six hash 
maps as there are six characteristics used in the matching process.  The values are obtained while 
looping through the GRL entries and comparing the individual asset pattern characteristics of the 
GRL entry to the unknown design.  The matching of the individual characteristics is essentially 
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an intersection of sets in order to determine the percentage of assets contained within the 
unknown design with respect to each GRL entry. 
While looping through the GRL entries, the individual asset traces of the asset pattern 
characteristics are taken individually and compared to the asset traces of the same asset pattern 
characteristics of the unknown design.  For example, the first asset pattern characteristic of the 
GRL entry, the input port signal external asset pattern, is broken up into individual asset traces 
and compared to the input port signal external asset traces of the unknown designs.  Each asset 
trace is looped through individually in order to find the largest match between asset traces.  The 
largest match is found by finding the intersection of the two asset traces (many examples are 
given below for clarification).  Once the largest match is assigned to the individual asset traces, 
they are added together and divided by the total number of asset traces in order to find the asset 
pattern percentage match.  This is summarized in the Equation 1 below. 
                           (Eq. 1) 
In order to clarify the matching process, several examples have been given in Table 10.  
These examples show how each asset trace of an unknown design matches to an asset trace of a 
GRL entry. 
TABLE 10:  General Asset Trace Matching Examples 
Case Unknown Design Asset Traces GRL Entry Asset Traces Match 
1 DATA_MEMORY, CRITICAL DATA_ MEMORY, CRITICAL 100% 
2 DATA_ MEMORY, CRITICAL SYSTEM_CONTROL 0% 
3 DATA_ MEMORY, CRITICAL 
DATA_ MEMORY, 
CRITICAL, 
SYSTEM_CONTROL 
67% 
4 DATA_ MEMORY, SYSTEM_CONTROL 
DATA_ MEMORY, 
SYSTEM_TIMING 50% 
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Case 1 in Table 10 gives the simple scenario that both asset traces are identical.  In this 
case, the match is clearly 100%.  Case 2 is also a simple example showing that the match will be 
0% when the asset traces have no intersection.  Case 3 shows the scenario in which the two asset 
traces intersect on two assets; however, the GRL entry contains a third asset not found in the 
unknown design asset trace, causing the final match to be 67%.  Finally, Case 4 considers the 
scenario in which one asset is shared while the other asset is different.  This case yields a 50% 
asset trace match.  If these asset traces where combined to form an asset pattern for a specific 
asset pattern characteristic, the final match for that characteristic could be easily determined by 
averaging the percentages listed.  Therefore, the asset pattern characteristic match would be 
54.25%. 
In certain instances, one of the characteristics of a design may be empty.  For example, if 
a design does not contain internal signals, then there will be no assets assigned to internal signals 
and those asset pattern characteristics will be empty.  In the case that both the GRL entry and the 
unknown design both have the same characteristic as empty, the hash map containing the match 
percentages is marked with a -1 value indicating that this characteristic will be left out of the 
final matching. 
3.3.2.2  GRL Partial Matching Algorithm 
In order to gain a more precise indication of the match between asset traces, an algorithm 
for partially matching asset traces was developed.  This algorithm takes into account the fact that 
there is occasional overlap among assets and therefore there must be a way to assign a 
percentage match to these assets greater than zero.  For example, when matching the 
DATA_SENSITIVE asset to the DATA_COMPUTATIONAL asset using the normal intersection 
set matching, the result would be a 0% match.  However, due to the fact that these assets are 
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similar in nature, the matching percentage should be greater than 0%.  This is the problem 
addressed by the partial matching algorithm. 
The partial matching algorithm is implemented during the matching of asset traces.  
Using general intersection set matching, the assets are analyzed and assigned a value by 
determining whether or not the assets found within one set matches the assets found in the other 
set.  Instead, partial matching runs each individual asset through a method that analyzes the asset 
to determine if it is part of a subset of similar assets.  The set of similar assets are then searched 
for within the asset trace intended for matching to determine whether or not any are found.  In 
the case that another asset that is similar in nature to the asset in question is found in the other 
asset trace, a 50% match is assigned for that individual asset.  This 50% match is then factored in 
with the remaining assets that are a part of the asset trace. 
The partial matching algorithm uses certain subsets of assets to determine whether or not 
an asset should receive a partial match.  These subsets of assets can be found in Table 11 below. 
TABLE 11:  Partial Matching Asset Categories 
SYSTEM_CONTROL DATA_SENSITIVE INSTRUCTION STATUS 
SELECT DATA_ 
ENCRYPTION 
DATA_OP READY 
READ DATA_ 
COMMUNICATION 
MEMORY_OP DONE 
WRITE DATA_ 
COMPUTATIONAL 
PROGRAM_ 
COUNTER_OP 
HOLD 
INSTRUCTION DATA_MEMORY INTERRUPT_OP STATUS 
MODE DATA_PERIPHERAL   BUSY 
SET     WAIT 
RESET       
ENABLE       
EXECUTE       
HANDSHAKING       
LOAD       
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TABLE 11:  Partial Matching Asset Categories (Cont.) 
SYSTEM_CONTROL DATA_SENSITIVE INSTRUCTION STATUS 
SHIFT       
INTERRUPT_ 
CONTROL 
      
PERIPHERAL_ 
CONTROL 
      
REGISTER_FILE_ 
CONTROL 
      
COMMUNICATION_ 
CONTROL 
      
CLOCK_CONTROL       
TIMER_CONTROL       
 
As the table shows, there are four categories of assets that can be partially matched.  The 
four categories are represented by the assets listed in the top row of each column.  The partial 
matching algorithm consists of first identifying whether one of the assets listed in the top row is 
contained within either the GRL entry asset trace or the unknown design asset trace.  If one of 
the assets is found in either asset trace, the other asset trace is parsed for one of the assets in the 
column of the original asset found.  If one of those assets is found, a 50% match is assigned for 
this set of assets. 
In order to clarify the partial matching algorithm, several examples are shown in Table 12 
below, listing the two asset traces along with a partial match percentage. 
TABLE 12:  Partial Asset Trace Matching Examples 
Case Unknown Design Asset Traces GRL Entry Asset Traces Match 
1 DATA_MEMORY DATA_ SENSITIVE 50% 
2 DATA_ MEMORY, DATA_ SENSITIVE DATA_ SENSITIVE 50% 
3 DATA_ MEMORY DATA_COMPUTATIONAL 0% 
4 ENABLE, SET SET, SYSTEM_CONTROL 75% 
5 RESET SET, SYSTEM_CONTROL 25% 
 
Case 1 provides the simple example of two assets that can be partially matched at 50%.  
The matching scenario in Case 2 shows that the two DATA_ SENSITIVE assets are matched at 
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100%; however, since the unknown design contains an additional asset, DATA_ MEMORY, the 
final match is 50%.  It is important to note with this example that since the DATA_SENSITIVE 
asset in the GRL entry was matched with the DATA_SENSITIVE asset in the unknown design, it 
could not be partially matched with the DATA_MEMORY asset.  Case 3 shows that even though 
the two assets are data assets, they are not partially matched.  For a partial match to occur, one of 
the assets had to be a DATA_SENSITIVE asset.  Case 4 describes a scenario in which the SET 
assets are matched at 100% while the ENABLE and SYSTEM_CONTROL assets are matched at 
50%, resulting in a final match of 75%.  Finally, Case 5 describes a scenario in which the 
SYSTEM_CONTROL asset is partially matched to the RESET asset at 50%.  Since the GRL entry 
has one additional asset, the final match is 25%. 
3.3.2.3  Functionality Considerations 
In addition to the partial asset matching, an algorithm that considers the functionality of 
the GRL entries was developed in order to take advantage of the precise nature of many of the 
assets.  The external assets of the unknown design can give an indication as to what functionality 
that design may be.  By searching for the functionality-specific assets assigned to the unknown 
design, the algorithm takes into consideration the GRL entries with that same functionality and 
weights them greater than the entries without that functionality assignment. 
As mentioned, this aids in the final matching of the unknown design to a functionality.  
During the analysis of individual asset pattern characteristics, the algorithm recognizes whether 
or not one of these assets is contained within the asset pattern characteristic.  In the case that a 
functionality-specific asset is present, all of the GRL entries with the corresponding functionality 
are given a weight of 1.5 in order to give these entries precedence.  Therefore, the match 
percentage for only that characteristic will be multiplied by 1.5.  For example, in the case that the 
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input port signal external asset pattern contains a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset, the match 
percentage for the input port signal external asset pattern of all GRL entries of functionality type 
encryption unit are multiplied by 1.5.  However, the other asset pattern characteristics do not 
necessarily receive the multiplier unless other functionality-specific assets are also contained in 
those characteristics. 
3.3.2.4  Final Matching 
Once each individual asset pattern characteristic hash map has been filled with values 
representing the individual asset pattern matches, the final asset pattern match for each GRL 
entry can be determined.  Each individual asset pattern characteristic is taken into account during 
the final asset pattern match; however, not all of the asset pattern characteristics are weighted 
equally.  There are several reasons for this.  The most important reason is that certain designs can 
be implemented in several different ways.  For example, the internal implementation of one ALU 
may be completely different from that of another ALU even though they accomplish the same 
purposes.  However, both of the ALUs will have similar I/O port signal external assets.  
Therefore, the I/O port signal external assets should be weighted higher than the internal 
characteristics of the design, including the internal signal assets.  An additional reason for having 
larger weight for I/O port signal external assets is that the internal assets of multiples designs are 
similar to each other even if the designs have different functionalities. 
Now that it has been established that not all asset pattern characteristics should be 
weighted the same, the next question to address is the amount of weight that each characteristic 
should be given.  After performing extensive testing in order to determine the proper weight, the 
values seen in Table 13 below were finalized. 
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TABLE 13:  Asset Pattern Characteristic Weighting 
Asset Pattern Characteristic Weight 
input port signal external asset pattern 3× 
output port signal external asset pattern 3× 
internal signal external asset pattern 1× 
input port signal internal asset pattern 1× 
output port signal internal asset pattern 1× 
internal signal internal asset pattern 1× 
 
As the table shows, the port signal external asset patterns receive the largest weight, three 
times larger than any other characteristic (the weighting of the asset pattern characteristics and 
the testing results will be discussed further in subsequent sections).  Once each individual asset 
characteristic values have been determined, the above weighting is applied to each characteristic, 
producing the final match value for each GRL entry to the unknown design.  As mentioned 
previously, certain designs do not contain every asset pattern characteristic.  Therefore, during 
the final matching these characteristics are simply omitted and the remaining characteristics are 
used to match an unknown design to the GRL entry. 
3.3.3  Golden Reference Library Results 
Following the generation of matching values of a GRL entry to an unknown design, an 
output file is generated containing the results of the matching analysis.  This file contains the 
match percentage along with the average match for each functionality.  An example of the output 
file can be seen in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6:  Golden Reference Library Match File 
The first line of this file gives the name of the unknown design being analyzed, which in 
this case is i2c_master.  The second line gives the best GRL entry match, which in this case is 
another i2c unit matching at 92.5%.  This line also gives the matching percentage for each asset 
pattern characteristic.  The remaining lines list the average percentage match among all 
functionalities with respect to the unknown design.  As one would expect, the communication 
functionality has the largest percentage match at 62%.  Additional information can be added to 
this file at the user’s discretion, such as the match value for every GRL entry. 
3.4  Trojan Detection Algorithms 
The final and most important component of analyzing unknown designs is the process of 
Trojan detection.  Several methodologies are employed in the detection of hardware Trojans.  
First, the results of asset filtering are utilized in order to identify suspicious asset patterns.  Asset 
filtering can reveal suspicious connections between signals within the design and therefore is 
essential in the identification of hardware Trojans.  Another methodology by which hardware 
Trojans may be identified consists of utilizing the functionality matching accomplished by the 
Golden Reference Library in order to match an untrusted design to a blacklisted design.  
Functionality matching also provides the opportunity of identifying suspicious connections 
 i2c_master 
Best Match: i2c : 92.5 (75.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0) 
Communication Match: 62 
Computational Match: 26 
Decoder/Encoder Match: 27 
Interrupt Unit Match: 50 
Control Generation Match: 13 
Peripheral Match: 3 
Register File Match: 17 
Encryption Unit Match: 20 
Shift Register Match: 17 
Timing Match: 20 
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among otherwise trusted instances.  Finally, characteristics of the RTL code itself are analyzed in 
order to detect specific hardware Trojans embedded within the logic of the circuit. 
In order to implement the methodologies of Trojan detection, the entire design is parsed 
and each signal is analyzed individually by applying certain heuristics for determining the 
presence of a Trojan.  A diagram of this process can be seen below in Figure 7. 
	
Figure 7:  Trojan Detection High-Level Diagram 
Of course not all possible hardware Trojans are intended to be detected using these 
methodologies, as new hardware Trojans are constantly being developed.  However, since the 
implementation of these methodologies was done in modular fashion, additional Trojan detection 
methods may be added in the future with relative ease.  The hardware Trojan designs used as the 
basis of these methodologies can be found on Trust-Hub’s website [11]. 
3.4.1  Asset Pattern Algorithms 
The first of the methodologies of Trojan detection, asset pattern recognition, consists of 
evaluating the external and internal asset traces assigned to an individual signal.  The internal 
and external asset traces are used in conjunction to determine whether or not the signal is being 
affected by a hardware Trojan.  For instance, the external asset trace of a signal can be analyzed 
to determine the external assets that have been filtered to a signal.  In certain cases, a Trojan can 
be identified by simply identifying that an external asset has been filtered to the signal, exposing 
a suspicious connection between internal signals.  Additionally, the internal asset trace assigned 
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to a signal can be useful in identifying suspicious driving assets by determining the internal logic 
affecting that signal. 
The first type of Trojan detected using asset pattern recognition involves the analysis of 
signals dealing with the timing of a design.  One type of attack on a timing signal consists of a 
SET or RESET asset being filtered to a signal that had been originally assigned a SYSTEM_ 
TIMING or SUBSYSTEM_TIMING asset.  This scenario is an example of a denial of service 
attack against a timing signal of a design, as the set or reset signal could disable the timing of the 
circuit.  This attack is detected by analyzing the asset traces of the timing signals and searching 
for filtered assets such as SET and RESET. 
Additional Trojan detection methods involving asset pattern recognition identify 
malicious logic being implemented within encryption units.  The first method involves 
identifying the modification of an encryption unit key by an attacker.  The benchmarks 
developed by Trust-Hub specifically address this potential Trojan [11].  If an attacker were able 
to modify the encryption key, then the he or she would be able to decrypt any message being 
encrypted by the encryption unit.  This attack is identified by detecting the internal asset trace 
assigned to a signal with a KEY external asset.  If the internal asset trace contains any assets 
indicating that the signal has been modified, such as a CONCURRENT_DRIVEN asset, the signal 
is known to have been modified.  Therefore, the signal containing these assets is flagged as 
malicious.  Another attack involving encryption units consists of the encryption key being leaked 
to the output.  In this scenario, an attacker could gain access to the key of the encryption unit by 
using a certain trigger sequence.  This type of attack is detected by analyzing the output port 
signal external asset pattern to determine if a KEY asset has been filtered to any of the outputs.  If 
this scenario has occurred, the signal that has received a KEY asset is flagged as malicious. 
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Another asset pattern algorithm involves the analysis of signals containing CRITICAL 
assets.  Since CRITICAL assets are intended for signals that are to be protected from leaking 
information to attackers, these signals are extremely important to protect.  Therefore, one of the 
Trojan detection methods checks the outputs of all circuits to see if a CRITICAL asset has been 
passed to it.  If this is the case, then that output is marked as susceptible to critical information 
leakage.  A similar Trojan detection method analyzes the input and output signals of a top-level 
design.  For each of these signals, this method checks the assigned assets and compares them to 
the filtered assets.  In the case that the set of filtered assets are not contained within the set of 
tagged assets, it is possible that a suspicious connection has been made with one of the signals in 
question.  In this case, the signal is marked as suspicious and presented to the user for further 
inspection. 
The final Trojan detection method pertaining to the analysis of asset patterns involves 
analyzing the primary port signals of the unknown design.  This method checks the assets that 
have been assigned to the primary signals and compares them to the filtered assets of the same 
signal.  Due to the fact that malicious logic could be inserted into the unknown design, 
unexpected assets could be filtered to the primary signals.  In the case that the filtered assets are 
not contained within the set of assets that have been assigned to the signal, the port signal is 
marked as being connected to malicious logic within the unknown design. 
3.4.2  Functionality Assignment Algorithms 
The next set of Trojan detection algorithms consists of analyzing the functionality 
assigned to a design during GRL matching.  Functionality assignment can be leveraged in 
several ways in order to detect the inclusion of a hardware Trojan.  First, the process of GRL 
functionality matching can reveal that a design has been compromised by Trojans by matching 
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the design to a blacklisted functionality.  Additionally, functionality assignment can reveal 
suspicious connections between instances that otherwise would seem harmless.  Finally, the 
functionality assignment, coupled with asset pattern recognition, can reveal information leakages 
in large designs. 
3.4.2.1  Blacklisted Functionalities 
The first category of functionality algorithms used to detect Trojans incorporates a 
blacklist of Trojan-infested designs.  The use of a blacklist to detect Trojans is a natural 
extension of the Golden Reference matching presented previously.  Rather than matching an 
unknown design to a trusted design that is a part of the whitelisted GRL, the Golden Reference 
matching analyzes the unknown design to determine if it matches to a blacklisted functionality.  
The blacklist contains designs that are known to contain Trojans.  Therefore, if an unknown 
design matches to a design containing Trojans rather than a trusted design, the unknown design 
is labeled as suspicious.  The blacklisted designs were accumulated by creating asset patterns 
from the Trojan-infested examples developed by Trust-Hub [11]. 
A list of the blacklist functionalities can be seen in Table 14 below.  As the table 
indicates, several of the blacklisted functionalities are similar to the whitelisted functionalities 
noted previously.  Therefore, the blacklisted functionalities are necessary to detect small 
differences in implementation between legitimate designs and Trojan-infested designs. 
TABLE 14:  Blacklist Functionalities 
Functionality Description 
TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT Assigned to Trojan-infested encryption units leaking  
TROJAN_TRIGGER Assigned to Trojan triggers designed to initiate Trojan 
attacks in other entities 
TROJAN_SHIFT_REGISTER Assigned to Trojan-infested shift registers 
TROJAN_COMMUNICATION Assigned to Trojan-infested communication units 
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3.4.2.2  Suspicious Connections 
Another aspect of functionality detection that can be utilized to detect Trojans is the 
identification of suspicious connections between instances.  After first assigning functionalities 
to unknown entities and sub-entities of a design, the connections between the instances of the 
entities can be analyzed to determine whether or not a Trojan is present.  Occasionally, an 
instance found in a legitimate design can be used as a trigger to leak information. 
Several suspicious types of connections are specifically searched for during the Trojan 
detection process.  The first two involve suspicious connections involving an encryption unit.  
Certain instances within an encryption unit can allow information leakage if an activation 
sequence is coded.  The first of these connections involves the use of a shift register to leak data 
from the encryption unit.  This scenario has been implemented in one of Trust-Hub’s 
benchmarks.  Another connection that allows information leakage from an encryption unit 
involves a counter instance being used as a trigger. 
Another functionality that is susceptible to this type of attack is the register file.  Since 
the register file stores data, an attacker may seek to gain access to the data via a hardware Trojan.  
Lower level connections of a register file could be used as a trigger to gain access to this data.  
Similarly to the encryption unit Trojan detection methods, the register file entities are searched to 
uncover possible lower level connections with shift register or counter functionalities.  In all of 
these cases, the malicious connection is identified by first starting with the top-level entity of an 
analyzed design and recursively searching for all connections between entities of the design.  If a 
higher level entity, such as the encryption unit or register file, contains a lower-level connection 
between entities that could serve as a trigger, such as a counter or a shift register, then the lower-
level entity is marked as malicious and presented to the user for inspection. 
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3.4.2.3  Functionality Detection with Asset Pattern Recognition 
The final category of functionality-based Trojan detection methods involves the 
additional information of the asset pattern in order to identify Trojans.  This additional 
information assists in the detection of information leakages as it allows for identification of 
specific assets found within suspicious functionalities.  Due to the fact that the external assets 
were developed and intended for specific functionalities, if one of the specific assets was found 
outside of the designated functionality, malicious connections between instances could be 
present in the RTL code.  One of the Trojan detection methods of this category involves the 
leakage of an encryption unit key.  If an encryption key were found outside of an encryption unit, 
there would be a strong indication that an attacker is trying to obtain the key and decrypt 
messages from the encryption unit.  Additionally, other types of assets are verified to be 
contained only within designated functionalities in order to guarantee that there are no suspicious 
connections between instances.  By analyzing the individual signals of a design and comparing 
them to the functionality of that design, these types of attacks can be recognized and reported.  
For example, another Trojan detection method within this category consists of the analysis of 
interrupts being found outside interrupt units.  Interrupt signals found within certain 
functionalities, such as TIMING and CONTROL_GENERATION, could be used to disrupt the 
control of the design by a malicious attacker.  The attacker could send a false interrupt to trigger 
an unwanted state.  Therefore, if an interrupt is filtered to an entity that typically does not 
process interrupts, the interrupt signal is marked as being malicious. 
3.4.3  RTL Characteristics 
The final category of Trojan detection algorithms consists of parsing the RTL code to 
discover malicious logic inserted by attackers.  Oftentimes such logic will consist of various 
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Trojan triggers, such as time bomb counters or finite state machines.  These triggers initiate the 
leakage of data or denial of service.  After recognizing potential triggers during the parsing of the 
RTL code, certain algorithms are applied to the signal in question in order to determine its 
legitimacy.  These algorithms also consist of analyzing the external and internal asset trace 
assigned to the signal. 
The first category of Trojans detected using RTL code consists of denial of service 
attacks.  Denial of service attacks are extremely prevalent in hardware against such signals as 
clocks and interrupts and result in a portion of the circuit becoming unavailable due to malicious 
logic.  Detecting denial of service attacks involves the analysis of individual signal assignments.  
A common scenario in which a signal is the subject of a denial of service attack consists of the 
attacker substituting a Trojan signal for the actual signal.  Consequently, the intended signal does 
not have an internal asset pattern as it is a floating signal in the design and the Trojan signal is 
taking its place.  Therefore, denied signals can be recognized by identifying the internal asset 
trace for internal assets.  If there are no internal assets indicating that the signal drives or is 
driven by another signal, then that signal is being denied and is marked as such.  Additional 
denial of service attacks can be applied to encryption keys.  Attackers could potentially modify 
the encryption key and could use a different key known only to them.  This is detected by 
analyzing the encryption key signal and determining whether it has been modified. 
Another category of Trojans detected using RTL code involves time bomb counters.  
Time bomb counters are used as a trigger for many types of Trojan attacks, such as information 
leakage or denial of service.  The signals used to implement time bomb counters can be 
identified by examining the structure of the RTL code.  Each signal is parsed to determine 
whether it serves as a counter within the design.  If so, additional verifications are applied to 
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determine whether the signal is being used as a Trojan trigger.  This is accomplished by checking 
the internal asset trace of the signal to determine whether it conditionally drives another signal.  
If this is the case, the signal is marked as a potential time bomb counter and the signal that is 
triggered by the counter is marked as a susceptible to a time bomb counter.  A separate Trojan 
detection method related to time bomb counters also performs a verification to determine 
whether the signals being conditionally driven by the counter is connected to the output.  While 
the previous time bomb counter detection method targets all types of Trojan attacks, this 
detection method specifically targets information leakage attacks that result in a suspicious 
driving assignment to an output signal.  If the time bomb counter is conditionally driving an 
output, the counter is marked as a trigger for an information leakage attack and the susceptible 
signals are also noted.  Trust-Hub provides several examples dealing with time bomb counters, 
and these were used for testing this methodology. 
An additional category of Trojan detection methods involving RTL code consists of finite 
state machine detection.  Trojans can be implemented by attackers in the form of a finite state 
machine (FSM) with an unwanted state that is only entered in rare conditions.  The result of the 
trigger condition can be information leakage or denial of service.  The first detection method 
involving an FSM examines the conditional signal used to determine the state of an FSM.  The 
number of states in the FSM is also examined to determine if it matches the number of cases 
possible based on the size of the conditional signal.  In the case that there is not an OTHERS state 
listed, a Trojan could be implemented in the RTL code by having an unwanted state that would 
typically be sent to the OTHERS state.  Therefore, the FSM is marked as suspicious.  
Additionally, the FSM is checked to guarantee that every possible state is accounted for as 
defined by the size of the conditional signal.  In the case that there are fewer states than the 
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signal allows, the FSM is marked as suspicious.  This is due to the fact that an attacker could 
gain access to the gate-level netlist and insert an additional state to perform an unwanted task.  
These FSM detection methods are used as warnings against potentially malicious logic being 
implemented by an attacker and indicate to the user that the FSM should be verified as secure. 
Several more Trojan detection methods involve analysis of RTL code.  First, the 
assignment statements of individual signals are checked for trigger sequences.  For example, an 
assignment such as “X <= Y(0) AND Y(1) AND Y(2)” is a potential Trojan activation sequence 
for the signal X as it only goes high in the case that the Y vector reaches the value “111.”  This 
type of signal assignment could be a Trojan trigger sequence implementing a denial of service or 
information leakage attack.  However, additional criteria must be met in order to mark the 
assignment as suspicious.  The signal X must also be triggering a process or driving a conditional 
statement.  This can easily be verified by analyzing the internal asset trace assigned to the 
potential trigger signal.  If the signal X contains an internal asset indicating that it triggers 
another signal, the signal assignment of X is marked as suspicious.  Additionally, any other 
signal being driven by X is marked as susceptible to a Trojan attack. 
One final Trojan detection method using RTL code involves the detection of extra 
circuitry added to a design.  An attacker often inserts extra circuitry in order to increase the 
payload and/or perform unnecessary switching activities.  Several examples provided by Trust-
Hub implement attacks of this nature.  While not every scenario of adding circuitry can be 
detected by this methodology, the examples provided by Trust-Hub have been tested and 
detected.  In Trust-Hub’s examples, an entire instance is being used as additional circuitry within 
a design.  However, the instance used as additional logic does not contain outputs as it only 
performs unnecessary switching.  Therefore, the detection method analyzes the instances to 
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determine if output signals are present.  If no outputs are present, the instance is marked as an 
addition of malicious logic. 
3.4.4  Trojan Detection Report 
After performing all Trojan detection methods, a list of Trojans is compiled and 
presented in user-readable format.  An example of a portion of a Trojan detection report can be 
found in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8:  Trojan Detection Report 
The Trojan detection report contains specific information about each Trojan present in 
the design.  In this example, the top of the report lists the name of the entity being analyzed, 
RSACypher.  This entity is a Trojan-infested encryption unit implementing the RSA algorithm.  
A portion of the report shown lists two different Trojans present in the design, KEY_LEAK and 
ENCRYPTION_UNIT_LEAK.  In addition to the Trojan type, the output report also lists the 
entity, instance and signal that are being affected by the Trojan.  In this example, both Trojans 
Trojan Information for:  
   RSACypher: 
  
Type of Trojan found: KEY_LEAK 
Entity: 
 RSACypher 
Instance: 
 Top_Level_Instance 
Signal: 
 inExp 
 
Type of Trojan found: ENCRYPTION_UNIT_LEAK 
Entity: 
 RSACypher 
Instance: 
 Top_Level_Instance 
Signal: 
 cypher 
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are being applied to the RSACypher entity.  In some cases, additional information is added to the 
output report.  An example of this can be seen in Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9:  Trojan Detection Report with Driving Signals 
In this example, a time bomb counter has been detected by the methodology.  Therefore, 
the output report notes the signals that contribute to the implementation of the Trojan.  As the 
report indicates, the TIMER signal is used as the time bomb counter to leak the SECRETKey.  
Therefore, the Trojan detection report also lists the “Driving Signal” used to leak the 
SECRETKey signal for the user to know which signal is being affected by the time bomb 
counter.  In this case, multiple Trojans are present in the same design. 
3.5  GUI Implementation 
The entire methodology of hardware Trojan detection is implemented using a Java-based 
GUI.  This tool allows a user to easily navigate to a VHDL file to be analyzed for Trojans.  The 
main GUI home screen can be seen below in Figure 10. 
Type of Trojan found: TIME_BOMB_COUNTER 
Entity: 
 input_output 
Instance: 
 Top_Level_Instance 
Signal: 
 TIMER 
 
Type of Trojan found: TIME_BOMB_SIGNAL 
Entity: 
 input_output 
Instance: 
 Top_Level_Instance 
Signal: 
 SECRETKey 
Driving Signal: 
 TIMER(15) 
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Figure 10:  GUI Home Screen 
The left side of the screen indicates the steps that must be initiated by the user in order to 
perform the methodology while the right side keeps a log of the entire process.  Each individual 
step is fairly self-explanatory.  The colored dots next to the step indicate the status of each step.  
A green dot indicates that the process has been finished, a yellow dot indicates that the step is 
ready to be initiated and a red dot means that previous steps must be completed before the step 
can be initiated.  Step 1 allows the user to browse to the top-level file and parse the VHDL code.  
In the screenshot of the GUI shown above, this step has already been initiated and logged on the 
right side of the screen.  The second step allows the user to assign external assets to the primary 
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port signals of the chosen design.  The external assets can either be assigned manually or 
imported from an asset assignment file (the third step is used to assign specific internal assets for 
another project).  After assets have been assigned, the fourth step initiates both asset filtering and 
GRL matching.  At this point, the output report giving the results of GRL matching is generated.  
The final step in the process is to analyze the design for Trojans.  The results of the Trojan 
detection are also written to a file for the user to examine. 
During the second step of the tool, the user has the option of assigning assets manually.  
If this option is chosen, the dialog box found in Figure 11 appears. 
 
Figure 11:  External Asset Assignment Dialog Box 
As the screenshot shows, the user has the option of choosing any primary I/O port signal 
from the list on the left side of the screen.  On the right side of the screen, the user has the option 
of assigning an asset to the selected signal with the “Assign Asset” button.  If this button is 
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selected, an additional dialog box appears giving the entire list of assets for the user to choose 
from.  Additionally, the user could remove an asset that was accidentally assigned with the 
“Remove Asset” button.  Once all assets are assigned the user has the option to save the asset 
assignments to a “.asset” file for future usage.  Finally, a log is shown at the bottom of the dialog 
box to allow the user to track the assets that have been assigned. 
Several output reports are generated while using the tool.  Following the fourth step in the 
process, the percentage match file is generated along with a GRL file for each entity and sub-
entity of the design being run.  Both of these files are in the “OutputFiles” directory, which is in 
the same location of the tool.  The other generated file is the Trojan detection report, which can 
be found in the “TrojanFiles” directory in the same location as the tool. 
 
 48 
4.  RESULTS 
4.1  Introduction 
The individual portions of the Trojan detection methodology were tested and analyzed 
concurrently with their development.  The majority of the testing focused on collecting results of 
the GRL matching and Trojan detection methods and guaranteeing that they performed as 
expected.  The Trust-Hub benchmarks were instrumental for the testing of the individual Trojan 
detection methods.  After ensuring the correctness of these methods, they were tested on larger 
designs to ensure that they could detect multiple Trojans in the same large design. 
4.2  GRL Matching 
The Golden Reference Library methodology for matching unknown designs to entries in 
the GRL required significant testing in order to ensure that the matching produced correct 
results.  The first step in testing the matching was to optimize the matching specifications, 
particularly with regard to the weighting of the asset pattern characteristics of the design.  Once 
the matching methodology was finalized, many unknown designs were tested by matching to a 
GRL entry.  An example is given to show the process by which an unknown design is matched to 
a GRL entry along with the results of the matching. 
4.2.1  Asset Pattern Weighting 
The weighting of the individual asset pattern characteristics was discussed in detail in the 
methodology section.  As noted, the external asset patterns of the input and output port signals 
were given precedence over all other asset patterns by multiplying their match value by three.  
This value was obtained through two guiding principles as well as trial and error. 
The first principle in establishing a weighting value for each asset pattern characteristic is that 
port signals are the most important in determining the functionality of an unknown design.  
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While the internal implementation of a functionality type can vary, the port signals often share 
the same characteristics.  For example, Figure 12 below shows the port signals of an ALU.  As 
the list of port signals show, there are two input data vectors and one output data vector.  
Additionally, the design contains an operation signal as well as a carry out and a flag.  For 
comparison, Figure 13 shows the port signals of a different ALU. 
 
Figure 12:  First ALU Port Signals 
 
Figure 13:  Second ALU Port Signals 
As the port signals of the second design show, there are many similarities between the 
two ALUs.  Each ALU contains an operation signal as well as two data input vectors and a result 
output vector.  If the specific assets of DATA_COMPUTATIONAL and DATA_OP are assigned 
to these signals, the port signal asset pattern matches will be nearly identical.  However, the 
internal logic of the ALU designs consists of vastly different implementations resulting in 
completely different internal asset patterns.  If the internal asset patterns of the designs were 
weighted the same as the port signal asset patterns, the close match of the port signal asset 
entity ALU_VHDL is 
   port 
   ( 
      Nibble1, Nibble2 : in std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
      Operation : in std_logic_vector(2 downto 0); 
      Carry_Out : out std_logic; 
      Flag : out std_logic; 
      Result : out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0) 
   ); 
end entity ALU_VHDL; 
entity simple_alu is 
port(   Clk : in std_logic; --clock signal 
        A,B : in signed(7 downto 0); --input operands 
        Op : in unsigned(2 downto 0); --Operation to be performed 
        R : out signed(7 downto 0)  --output of ALU 
        ); 
end simple_alu; 
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patterns would cancel with the poor match of the internal asset patterns. Therefore, it would not 
indicate that each design belongs to the same category.  Thus, the weighting for the port signal 
asset patterns should be greater than the internal asset patterns. 
After establishing that the port signal asset patterns should be given greater weights than 
the internal asset patterns, the next question is how much weight they should be given.  Based on 
the previous principle, there is no identifiable limit to the weight given to a port signal.  
Therefore, the second principle gives guidance to an approximate limit for the weight of port 
signals.  The second principle states that the internal asset patterns reveal the inclusion of 
malicious logic, and therefore must also carry weight in order to match to blacklist designs 
containing Trojans. 
The testing of values for the weight of the individual characteristics consisted of trial and 
error with multiple weighting values.  After implementing multiple weighting values, the two 
options that resulted in the best matches were between two and three as the weight factor to the 
port signal asset patterns.  The two options were compared by running the same design through 
the matching process using both values and comparing the results.  Rather than only comparing 
the value of the closest matched design, the average match value for entire functionality 
categories were examined.  In this way, the improvement of using certain values as a weight 
factor was easier to determine.  After further comparison between these two options, the 
weighting value of three produced the closest match.  Noticeable improvement was seen across 
multiple types of designs in the desired functionality category.  More importantly, the average 
match values for the categories other than the matched functionality were significantly lower 
with the weight value of three than that of two. 
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4.2.2  GRL Matching Example 
The following example proves the effectiveness of the GRL matching methodology as 
well as illustrating the process of matching an unknown design to a GRL entry.  As mentioned in 
the methodology section, an unknown design is analyzed first through the parsing process 
followed by asset assignment and filtering to produce an asset pattern.  The unknown design 
chosen to illustrate the matching methodology is a basic UART communication module.  The 
primary I/O signals of the design can be seen in Figure 14 below. 
 
Figure 14:  UART I/O Port Signals 
Following the parsing process, assets were assigned to each port signal.  The assignment 
of the assets was fairly straightforward.  The assigned assets are in Table 15 below.  After 
filtering the assets throughout the circuit, the asset pattern found in Figure 15 was produced. 
Due to the specificity of the assets, the majority of the assets assigned to this design are directly 
involved in the process of communication.  Therefore, during the matching phase of the 
methodology, the communication functionalities should theoretically have the highest match 
value. 
 
entity uart is 
port ( 
    clk: in std_logic; 
    reset: in std_logic; 
    rx_data: out std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
    rx_enable: out std_logic; 
    tx_data: in std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
    tx_enable: in std_logic; 
    tx_ready: out std_logic; 
    rx: in std_logic; 
    tx: out std_logic 
  ); 
end uart; 
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TABLE 15:  UART Asset Assignment 
Signal Asset 
clk SYSTEM_TIMING 
reset RESET 
rx_data DATA_COMMUNICATION 
rx_enable COMMUNICATION_CONTROL 
tx_data DATA_COMMUNICATION 
tx_enable COMMUNICATION_CONTROL 
tx_ready COMMUNICATION_STATUS 
rx COMMUNICATION_CONTROL 
tx COMMUNICATION_CONTROL 
 
 
Figure 15:  UART Asset Pattern 
The matching process iteratively compared the asset patterns of GRL entries to the asset 
pattern of the UART design.  As expected, the communication functionalities matched as closely 
as the unknown design.  In fact, the top five closest matches have communication functionalities 
and matched with a value of 80% or greater.  The GRL entry with the closest match is an 
interesting case study for understanding the matching process.  All of the asset pattern 
characteristics dealing with external assets (input port signal, output port signal and internal 
>[SYSTEM_TIMING] 
>*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
>[RESET] 
<[DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
>[DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
>*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE] 
>[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL] 
<[COMMUNICATION_STATUS] 
<[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL] 
/*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN] 
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN] 
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
/[DATA_COMMUNICATION] 
/[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL] 
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE] 
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
/[COMMUNICATION_STATUS] 
/*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING] 
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING, 
PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE] 
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signal) received a 100% match.  This occurs because of the specific assets and the functionality 
multiplier. 
However, the internal signals have a variety of matching values.  The internal asset 
pattern of the input signals matched at 75%, the internal asset pattern of the output signals 
matched at 0%, and the internal asset pattern of the internal signals matched at 78%.  The 0% 
match for the internal asset pattern characteristic of the output signals illustrates an important 
point in understanding the matching algorithm and the weighting of the asset pattern 
characteristics.  Although the remaining asset pattern characteristics have a high percentage 
match, the internal asset pattern of the output port signals has a 0% match because the two 
designs were coded differently in HDL.  While the output signals of the basic UART entity 
assigns values to the primary outputs inside a process block, the design matched with the UART 
design uses concurrent statements and conditional statements to assign values to its outputs.  
Therefore, even though the functionality of the designs is clearly the same, the internal asset 
patterns are greatly different.  As a result, the weighting of the asset pattern characteristics 
heavily favors the external asset pattern characteristics.  After the weighting of the asset pattern 
characteristics is applied, the final match is 85%, which gives a fairly certain indication that the 
functionality of the design is the communication functionality as was expected. 
4.3  Trojan Detection 
Thorough testing of the Trojan detection strategies presented in the methodology section 
required designs with Trojans inserted.  The Trust-Hub benchmarks [11] were used as a basis to 
perform unit testing of individual Trojan detection methods.  These benchmarks focused on 
encryption units and communication units containing Trojans performing information leakage or 
denial of service attacks.  In addition to the benchmarks created by Trust-Hub, several custom 
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benchmarks were developed in order to test the remaining Trojan detection methods that could 
not be tested with the examples provided by Trust-Hub.  After verifying the functionality of each 
Trojan detection method through unit testing, large designs with multiple Trojans inserted were 
used to further test the Trojan detection methods and guarantee that all Trojans in the design 
could be detected.  The first of the large designs was a crypto core developed by Trust-Hub with 
Trojans already inserted.  The second was an open-source microcontroller that had several 
custom Trojans that were inserted into the previously Trojan-free design.  
4.3.1  Trust-Hub Benchmarks 
The Trust-Hub benchmarks provide a useful tool for the unit testing of Trojan detection 
methods.  While not all of the Trust-Hub benchmarks are useful as they only contain gate-level 
netlists, a significant portion contain the RTL code required to test the Trojan detection methods 
of this methodology.  Along with a Trojan-infested design, Trust-Hub includes a design without 
the Trojan included so that the two designs can be compared.  Some of the benchmarks were 
written in Verilog rather than VHDL.  By using the XHDL tool [22], the Verilog designs could 
be converted into VHDL in order to be useful for testing. 
The first category of the Trust-Hub benchmarks consists of four RSA encryption units 
each containing a different type of Trojan.  The first of these benchmarks, called BasicRSA-
T100, leaks the encryption key when a specific plaintext string is entered.  The Trojan-infested 
portion of the design can be seen in Figure 16 below. 
 
Figure 16:  Encryption Unit Key Leak VHDL Example 
if indata = x"44444444" then 
 cypher <= key; -- Trojan leaks the private key through cypher output bus 
else 
 cypher <= tempout;  -- set output value 
end if; 
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As the VHDL code shows, the key leaks when the string “44444444” is entered.  Using 
traditional testing methods, this scenario is very difficult to discover, as it is a very rare 
condition.  However, by performing asset assignment and filtering, the asset pattern of the 
ciphertext output is shown to contain a KEY asset.  Therefore, the Trojan detection method 
designed to detect encryption unit leaks identifies the Trojan in this design. 
This benchmark also serves as a unit test for another Trojan detection method.  Since the 
Trojan is inserted into the design, the encryption key, which is assigned the external asset KEY, 
is directly driving the ciphertext, which is assigned the external asset DATA_ENCRYPTION.  
Therefore, the Trojan detection method ensuring that the filtered assets are contained within the 
tagged assets identifies that a suspicious connection occurs between the encryption key and the 
ciphertext.  The ciphertext output’s asset trace contains a KEY external asset due to filtering 
while the encryption key receives a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset.  Therefore, both of the signals 
are noted to be vulnerable to attacks. 
The next RSA Trojan benchmark, BasicRSA-T200, contains a denial of service attack 
against the encryption key.  Similar to the previous Trojan, the attack is triggered by a specific 
input sequence of plaintext. The Trojan-infested portion of the design can be seen in Figure 17 
below. 
 
Figure 17:  Encryption Unit Denial of Service VHDL Example 
As the VHDL code shows, the signal trojanKey is assigned a value when a certain string 
of plaintext is inserted.  This signal is then used as the encryption key for the BasicRSA-T200, 
Trojan: process (indata) is  
begin 
 if indata = x"01fa0301" then   
  trojanKey <= x"00000001"; 
 end if; 
end process Trojan; 
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while the original key is being denied.  As in the previous example, it is nearly impossible to test 
the scenario in which the specific string of plaintext is inserted, resulting in the denial of service 
attack.  However, the Trojan detection method identifying denial of service attacks detect this 
attack by identifying the internal asset pattern of the original encryption key.  Since the original 
key signal is replaced by the trojanKey signal, its internal asset pattern is empty, indicating the 
presence of a denial of service attack against the encryption unit key. 
Another RSA benchmark, BasicRSA-T300, has a similar payload to BasicRSA-T100 in 
that it leaks the encryption key.  However, it is triggered by a time bomb counter rather than a 
specific plaintext string.  The time bomb counter process can be seen in Figure 18 below. 
Additionally, the payload causing the leakage of the encryption key can be seen in Figure 19 
below. 
 
Figure 18:  Time Bomb Counter VHDL Example 
 
Figure 19:  Encryption Unit Denial of Service VHDL Example 
As the two portions of the design show, the time bomb counter will increment on the 
rising edge of the ds signal.  After incrementing twice, it will leak the encryption key.  Two 
separate Trojan detection methods identify this attack.  First, the same Trojan detection method 
TrojanTrigger: process (ds, reset) is  
begin 
 if reset='1' then 
  TrojanCounter <= x"00000000"; 
 elsif rising_edge(ds) then 
  TrojanCounter <= TrojanCounter + 1; 
 end if; 
end process TrojanTrigger; 
if TrojanCounter = x"00000002" then  
 cypher <= key; 
else 
 cypher <= tempout; 
end if; 
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used to identify the Trojan in BasicRSA-T100 detects the leak by identifying the asset pattern of 
the output.  Second, the Trojan detection method designed to identify time bomb counters detects 
the attack by first identifying the fact that TrojanCounter is a counter.  After identifying this fact, 
the detection method recognizes that it is contained within a conditional statement used to leak 
information.  Therefore, the TrojanCounter signal is identified as a time bomb counter used as a 
trigger for information leakage. 
The final RSA benchmark, BasicRSA-T400, contains the same trigger as the BasicRSA-
T300 benchmark as it uses a time bomb counter.  Additionally, the payload of this Trojan is the 
same as BasicRSA-T200 as it results in a denial of service attack.  Therefore, the detection 
methods used for detection in the previous attacks are used to identify the Trojan in this 
benchmark. 
The next set of Trust-Hub benchmarks consists of several AES encryption units 
containing various types of Trojans.  These designs are much larger than the RSA examples and 
contain several Trojans for each individual example.  One particular example in this set of 
benchmarks is a large crypto core, which is analyzed for numerous Trojans.  However, other 
benchmarks in this category are analyzed for Trojans in order to test the detection methods.  
Many of the designs in this category contained the same type of Trojans, so not all designs in this 
category will be discussed. 
The first Trojan attack found in this set of benchmarks consists of the encryption key 
being leaked to an instance that is not for encryption.  By doing so, the encryption key is leaked 
through a shift register acting as a leakage circuit.  This attack is found in AES-T600 and AES-
T2000.  By identifying the instance inside the encryption unit is a shift register and the 
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encryption has been leaked to it, the circuit is marked as susceptible to an attack leaking the 
encryption unit key. 
Another Trojan attack found in AES-T600 and AES-T2000 as well as AES-T1800 
implement a Trojan intended to drain the battery of the circuit by adding unnecessary circuitry.  
The shift register in the previous discussion and in AES-T1800 is the instance used as extra 
circuitry.  This is detected by noting that there are no outputs found in the instance, as it is being 
used only to perform unnecessary computations designed to drain the battery of the circuit.  The 
Trojan detection method utilizing functionality matching also is used to recognize this Trojan, as 
it detects shift registers being contained within encryption units.  Therefore, multiple detection 
methods are used to identify the same Trojan. 
The final major category of Trust-Hub benchmarks consists of the RS232 UART 
communication units.  The designs consist of a top-level entity with a transmitter instance and a 
receiver instance.  Several Trojans implemented in this category are identified using previously 
discussed Trojan detection methods.  However, there are a few new Trojans within this category 
that are detected with additional Trojan detection methods. 
Several designs in the RS232 category—namely RS232-T600, RS232-T700, and RS232-
T900—contain malicious FSMs used to activate a Trojan.  After a certain sequence is inputted to 
the communication unit, it reaches a state that causes the output information to be modified.  The 
Trojan detection methods pertaining to FSMs are utilized to detect Trojans in these designs.  As 
the methodology section mentioned, the Trojan FSM detection methods indicate the possibility 
of a Trojan and require user interaction for verification.  The fact that an input sequence is used 
to trigger a specific state could potentially be legitimate.  However, in this particular case, once 
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the user has been notified of a potential Trojan present, it can be easily verified that the FSM is 
being used as a Trojan. 
An additional method of Trojan detection utilized in this category of benchmarks is the 
matching of blacklisted designs.  Due to the fact that these designs use an FSM to implement 
Trojan triggers, the internal asset patterns of the Trojan-infested design are significantly different 
than the internal asset patterns of the Trojan-free version.  Therefore, the GRL matching 
algorithm matches the unknown design to a blacklisted functionality when analyzing other 
designs with a similar Trojan trigger. 
4.3.2  Additional Trojan Examples 
After performing unit tests with the Trust-Hub benchmarks for the relevant Trojan 
detection methods, the remaining Trojan detection methods were tested by producing designs 
containing the corresponding Trojans.  The first of the remaining Trojan detection methods 
tested is the Trojan resetting the timing signal of the design.  This is a simple example to test, as 
an internal clock signal assignment was modified to include a reset signal.  A sample assignment 
statement can be seen below. 
Internal_Clock <= Clock AND Reset; 
In this scenario, the internal clock is clearly reset rather than being directly driven by the clock 
port signal.  Therefore, anything driven by the internal clock will experience a denial of service 
attack.  This attack is detected by analyzing the external asset trace of the timing signals of the 
design.  In this scenario, the asset trace of the timing signals also contains a filtered RESET asset.  
Therefore, the timing signal with a RESET in its asset trace is noted as being vulnerable to a 
Trojan.  In addition to the clock-reset Trojan detection method, another Trojan detection method 
can be used to identify this attack.  This Trojan detection method deals more generally with 
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denial of service attacks to timing signals by analyzing the internal asset trace of the timing 
signals.  The denial of service attacks are detected by identifying internal assets indicating that 
the signal has been modified, such as CONCURRENT_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN and 
PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE.  In this example, the timing signal’s internal asset trace 
contains a CONCURRENT_DRIVEN asset due to the concurrent assignment statement.  
Therefore, the signal is also flagged as being vulnerable to a timing denial of service attack. 
The Trojans related to suspicious entities contained within register files were tested by 
creating connections to malicious instances in a previously secure register file.  The first type of 
Trojan tested is a counter instance inside a register file.  After creating a connection in the 
register file, the design was run through the tool, resulting in correct functionality matches for 
the register file and the counter.  Following the matching of the functionalities, the Trojan 
detection method identifies that a TIMING instance is found in a REGISTER_FILE top-level 
entity.  Therefore, the TIMING instance is correctly flagged as a Trojan.  Next, a malicious shift 
register was inserted in the register file.  Following the same process, both entities are correctly 
matched using the GRL.  The Trojan detection method consequently flags the shift register as a 
suspicious connection, correctly identifying the inserted Trojan. 
The next set of Trojan detection methods tested involved attacks on interrupt units.  The 
first of these attacks involved an interrupt signal being leaked to another component of the 
design, resulting in a number of possible failures in the circuit.  The unit test that was developed 
to test this detection method involved a counter instance being found within an interrupt unit.  
The port mapping of this instance can be seen in Figure 20 below. 
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Figure 20:  Counter Instance in Interrupt Unit 
When a specific interrupt signal arrives to the interrupt unit, it triggers the counter, 
eventually resulting in a denial of service attack against the interrupt unit.  However, this same 
detection method is valid for detecting other types of attacks to the design.  The detection 
method identifies an interrupt was sent to a TIMING instance and therefore flags the signal that is 
sent to the instance. 
Another Trojan detection method deals more generally with denial of service attacks 
against interrupt units.  In the unit test for this method, the input interrupt signal is being denied 
as a result of a Trojan signal being used in its place.  The Trojan signal is preset to a value, as the 
line below shows. 
signal trojanInterrupt : std_logic := '0'; 
The trojanInterrupt signal is then used in place of the intended interrupt signal.  A portion of the 
VHDL code can be seen below in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21:  Interrupt Unit Denial of Service Attack 
As this example shows, the value of the interrupt signal is preset and not modified, 
resulting in a denial of service attack.  This attack is detected by analyzing the internal asset 
trojanCounter: counter 
Port Map(C => CLK_I, 
  CLR => IR(0), 
  Q => tjCounter); 
if( trojanInterrupt = '1' ) then 
 int_pt <= pt(0); 
 INTR_O <= '1'; 
 next_s <= tx_int_info_priority; 
elsif( trojanInterrupt = '1' ) then 
 int_pt <= pt(1); 
 INTR_O <= '1'; 
 next_s <= tx_int_info_priority; 
end if; 
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pattern of the denied interrupt signal and identifying as not being used in the design.  Therefore, 
the interrupt signal is flagged as being denied, meaning that another signal has taken its place. 
The next Trojan detection method tested involved the identification of Trojan triggers in 
the form of concurrent assignment statements.  These statements are suspicious as they are 
involved in activating a signal under a rare circumstance.  Because of the limitations of testing, 
these rare conditions are often untested, ultimately resulting in the activation of the Trojan by an 
attacker.  A portion of the example designed to test the Trojan detection method can be seen 
below in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22:  Trigger Assignment Attack 
As this portion of the code shows, the signal b is triggered only when the A vector 
reaches its terminal value.  As a result, b goes high and the out_data is set to ‘0’.  In this 
scenario, trigger assignments have the ability to leak information through outputs or cause denial 
of service attacks.  Therefore, the assignment of b is marked as malicious and presented to the 
user. 
The next Trojan detection method to be tested involved the leakage of any signals 
assigned a CRITICAL output.  Users assign CRITICAL assets to signals that should be kept 
secure, such as an encryption key or other sensitive data.  Therefore, this Trojan detection 
method was tested by assigning a CRITICAL asset to an encryption key that was leaked through 
an output.  Many of the Trust-Hub designs implement this type of Trojan and were therefore 
used to test this method.  The method detects the information leak by analyzing the asset pattern 
b <= A(3) AND A(2) AND A(1) AND A(0); 
if (b='1') then 
 out_data <= '0'; 
else 
 out_data <= in_data; 
end if; 
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of the output signals.  Since the signal with the CRITICAL asset directly drives an output signal, 
the output signal contains a filtered CRITICAL asset.  Therefore, the output signal is marked as 
being susceptible to a leakage of critical information. 
4.3.3  Trojan-Infested Crypto Core Example 
In order to demonstrate how the Trojan detection methods extend to larger designs, 
multiple larger designs were analyzed for Trojans.  The first large design example involved the 
analysis of a crypto core found in the Trust-Hub benchmarks.  Specifically, the design is an AES 
core called AES-T600 in the Trust-Hub benchmark.  This design contained multiple Trojans 
intended to leak the encryption key.  Additional Trojans were also added to the design in order to 
demonstrate the abilities of multiple Trojan detection algorithms.  There were a total of 11 lower 
level entities in the design.  Although typically negligible, the filtering time for this design took 
significantly longer as it was a larger design using many rounds of encryption.  The total parse 
time took 6 seconds, the total filtering time took 5 minutes and 41 seconds and the Trojan 
detection time was negligible.  This process was performed on an Apple MacBook Pro with a 2.4 
GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 16 GB of RAM. 
The first step in analyzing the design was to assign external assets to the primary port 
signals.  The port signals for the design can be seen in Figure 23.  The asset assignment for the 
listed port signals was fairly self-explanatory.  The clk signal was assigned a SYSTEM_TIMING 
external asset, the rst signal was assigned a RESET asset, the in signal was assigned a 
DATA_ENCRYPTION asset, the key signal was assigned a KEY asset and the out signal was 
assigned a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset. 
 64 
 
Figure 23:  Crypto Core Port Signals 
Following asset assignment, the assets of the design were filtered throughout the circuit 
in order to obtain an asset pattern for the design.  The asset pattern was then used in the 
functionality matching for the individual entities of the design.  The functionality of the top-level 
design was correctly matched to an encryption unit.  Therefore, the multiple encryption unit 
Trojan detection algorithms were used to identify Trojans.   
The list of Trojans that were previously inserted into the design began with a time bomb 
counter inserted in the final round of encryption.  The trigger for this attack can be seen in Figure 
24 below.  As the figure shows, the Trojan counter increments on the rising edge of the clock.  
The counter is used to trigger an information leakage in the final round of encryption.  The 
payload of the attack is a leakage of the encryption key through the ciphertext output.  Therefore, 
by knowing the point at which the Trojan counter causes leakage, an attacker can observe the 
output of the encryption unit and obtain the key.  The information leakage portion of the VHDL 
code can be seen in Figure 25 below. 
 
Figure 24:  AES Time Bomb Trigger 
ENTITY top IS 
   PORT ( 
      clk         : IN STD_LOGIC; 
      rst         : IN STD_LOGIC; 
      in          : IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(127 DOWNTO 0); 
      key         : IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(127 DOWNTO 0); 
      out        : OUT STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(127 DOWNTO 0) 
   ); 
END ENTITY top; 
TrojanTrigger: process (clk) is 
    begin 
        if rising_edge(clk) then 
            TrojanCounter <= TrojanCounter + 1; 
        end if; 
    end process TrojanTrigger; 
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Figure 25:  AES Time Bomb Key Leakage 
As the portion of code shows, the encryption key is leaked through the output once the 
counter reaches the value of “44444444”.  This attack is detected by first applying the algorithm 
for identifying time bomb counters.  By identifying a counter was used in conjunction with a 
leakage of information, the TrojanCounter signal is flagged as a trigger for an information 
leakage attack while the state_out signal is flagged as the output port signal used to leak the 
information.  Additionally, this attack is also identified by applying the algorithm of detecting 
encryption keys leaking directly to an output.  By identifying the asset traces of both the 
state_out signal and the key_in signal, the Trojan attack is detected by recognizing the direct 
driving assignment between these two signals and that an encryption key could directly leak 
through an output port signal. 
The next attack found in the AES core involved a Trojan shift register.  The concept of a 
Trojan shift register was previously addressed when discussing the Trust-Hub benchmarks.  The 
Trojan shift register is used as additional logic performing a shift operation on the encryption 
key.  In doing so, it allows attackers to perform power analysis side-channel attack on this 
portion of the circuit and thus obtain the value of the encryption key.  It is initially triggered by a 
time bomb counter incrementing up to a certain value before performing the attack.  This attack 
is detected in multiple ways.  First, since the entity does not contain any outputs, it is 
immediately flagged as an inclusion of additional logic.  Second, the attack is identified as a 
PROCESS (clk) 
   BEGIN 
      IF (clk'EVENT AND clk = '1') THEN 
         state_out <= (z0 & z1 & z2 & z3); 
      ELSIF (TrojanCounter = x"44444444") THEN 
        state_out <= key_in; 
      END IF; 
   END PROCESS; 
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Trojan shift register through the functionality matching.  Finally, the trigger for the attack is 
identified as a time bomb counter through the time bomb counter Trojan detection method.  
Through the combination of all these Trojan detection methods, the evidence indicates that the 
entity in question is malicious. 
4.3.4  Trojan-Infested Microcontroller 
The final large design intended to test Trojan detection methods involves a 
microcontroller with Trojans inserted.  This example is different than the previous example in 
that the Trojans were not inserted by Trust-Hub or another third party.  Instead, the Trojan-free 
version of this design was obtained through OpenCores [13] then the Trojans were personally 
inserted in various positions throughout the design.  This was intended to show the capability of 
the Trojan detection methods of finding Trojans in a large design.  The design chosen from 
OpenCores to be evaluated was termed c16, which is an open-source 16-bit microcontroller.  The 
design has 19 lower level entities, such as a register file, an ALU, and a communication unit.  
This design was chosen due to the fact that it was already written in VHDL and required minimal 
modifications to be parsed by the tool.  The total parse time for the design was 18 seconds, the 
filtering time was 11 seconds and the Trojan detection time was negligible. 
Following the parsing process of the design, assets were assigned to the primary port 
signals.  Since the design was significantly larger than the unit tests, it was imperative to assign 
correct assets to the signals in order to adequately represent the functionality of the signal.  This 
is needed because the signal is filtered throughout a much larger design; and, if the signal is 
assigned to an incorrect asset then that asset propagates throughout a much larger space than if 
the design was smaller.  The port signals of the microcontroller can be seen in Figure 26 below.  
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Additionally, the asset assignment of the primary port signals from Figure 26 can be seen in 
Table 16 below. 
 
Figure 26:  Microcontroller Primary Port Signals 
TABLE 16:  Microcontroller Asset Assignment 
Signal Asset 
CLK40 SYSTEM_TIMING 
SWITCH DATA_PERIPHERAL 
SER_IN DATA_COMMUNICATION 
SER_OUT DATA_COMMUNICATION 
TEMP_SPO DATA_PERIPHERAL 
TEMP_SPI DATA_PERIPHERAL 
CLK_OUT SYSTEM_TIMING 
LED DATA_PERIPHERAL 
ENABLE_N ENABLE 
DEACTIVATE_N STATUS 
TEMP_CE PERIPHERAL_CONTROL 
TEMP_SCLK SUBSYSTEM_TIMING 
SEG1 DATA_PERIPHERAL 
SEG2 DATA_PERIPHERAL 
entity board_cpu is 
PORT (CLK40  : in  STD_LOGIC; 
  SWITCH  : in  STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (9 downto 0); 
  SER_IN  : in  STD_LOGIC; 
  SER_OUT  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  TEMP_SPO  : in  STD_LOGIC; 
  TEMP_SPI  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  CLK_OUT  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  LED   : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (7 downto 0); 
  ENABLE_N  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  DEACTIVATE_N : out STD_LOGIC; 
  TEMP_CE  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  TEMP_SCLK  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  SEG1   : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (7 downto 0); 
  SEG2   : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (7 downto 0); 
  XM_ADR  : out   STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(15 downto 0); 
  XM_CE_N  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  XM_OE_N  : out STD_LOGIC; 
  XM_WE_N  : in STD_LOGIC; 
  XM_DIO  : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(7 downto 0) 
     ); 
end board_cpu; 
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TABLE 16:  Microcontroller Asset Assignment (Cont.) 
Signal Asset 
XM_ADR ADDRESS_SENSITIVE 
XM_CE_N ENABLE 
XM_OE_N ENABLE 
XM_WE_N COMMUNICATION_CONTROL 
XM_DIO DATA_COMMUNICATION 
 
The first of the Trojans inserted in the design is a denial of service attack found in the 
ALU.  The attack targets the ALU instruction signal used to determine which operation is to be 
performed.  By controlling the instruction signal, an attacker has the ability to control which 
operation is to be performed by the ALU, therefore rendering it useless.  The Trojan was inserted 
as an additional signal, called ALU_OP_Trojan, that could be pre-programmed by an attacker 
while the original ALU instruction signal was denied.  A portion of the FSM controlled by the 
Trojan signal can be seen in Figure 27 below. 
 
Figure 27:  ALU Denial of Service 
With the Trojan signal controlling the FSM, the outputs from the ALU are untrusted.  
This attack was detecting by identifying that the original ALU instruction signal, called 
case ALU_OP_Trojan is 
 when ALU_MD_FIN => -- mult/div 
  if (QP_NEG = '0') then 
   ZZ <= PROD_REM(15 downto 0); 
  else 
   ZZ <= X"0000" - PROD_REM(15 downto 0); 
  end if; 
 
 when others => -- modulo 
  if (RM_NEG = '0') then 
   ZZ <= PROD_REM(31 downto 16); 
  else 
   ZZ <= X"0000" - PROD_REM(31 downto 16); 
  end if; 
end case; 
 69 
ALU_OP, was being denied since the design was being controlled by a Trojan instruction signal.  
Therefore, the original ALU instruction signal was flagged as a part of a denial of service attack. 
The next attack involved the insertion of a malicious state to an FSM contained within 
the memory component of the design.  The Trojan-free FSM typically contains an “OTHERS” 
state that handles remaining states that are not listed.  The Trojan-free version of the FSM can be 
seen in Figure 28 below. 
 
Figure 28:  Trojan-free Memory FSM 
As the example shows, when the LADR signal has a value of “0001”, the OUT_1 signal is 
assigned to the RDAT output signal.  When the LADR has any other value, the OUT_0 signal is 
assigned to the RDAT output signal.  However, the inserted Trojan results in the modification of 
the default value for the FSM.  The Trojan-infested version of the FSM can be seen in Figure 29 
below. 
 
Figure 29:  Trojan-infested Memory FSM 
As the Trojan-infested version shows, the “OTHERS” case has been removed and 
replaced with a state occurring when the LADR value is “0010”.  When this state is reached, an 
incorrect value is assigned to the RDAT signal.  Additionally, any case other than the two listed 
will not result in a change in the value of the RDAT output.  Therefore, this attack has modified 
the output data that is assigned to the RDAT signal.  This attack was detected using the FSM 
case LADR is 
 when "0001" => RDAT <= OUT_1; 
 when others =>  RDAT <= OUT_0; 
end case; 
case LADR is 
 when "0001" => RDAT <= OUT_1; 
 when "0010" => RDAT <= trojanOut; 
end case; 
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Trojan detection methods.  First, because the case statement does not contain an “OTHERS” 
state and not all states are listed, it is flagged as susceptible to the insertion of a Trojan as a 
malicious state.  Additionally, it is marked as susceptible to a gate-level Trojan inserted since not 
all states are accounted for.  Therefore, this attack was detected by identifying the missing states 
in the FSM. 
The next attack was inserted inside the UART communication unit resulting in a 
transmission of incorrect data.  The attack was triggered by a counter signal that counted on the 
rising edge of the clock.  The transmission of serial data was disrupted when the Trojan counter 
reached a certain value.  The Trojan payload occurred when the most significant bit of the Trojan 
counter is equal to zero.  The VHDL code can be seen in Figure 30 below. 
 
Figure 30:  UART Trojan Attack 
This scenario only occurs when the most significant bit of the Trojan counter goes high, 
and therefore it takes a significant amount of time to occur.  This scenario is also very time 
consuming to test, thus it is rarely caught through functional testing.  However, the time bomb 
counter Trojan detection method identifies the inclusion of the time bomb counter and 
subsequently identifies any signals triggered by the counter signal.  Therefore, both the time 
bomb counter signal and the serial out signal are flagged as a part of a Trojan attack. 
The final Trojan inserted into the microcontroller is another instance of additional logic 
in the form of a shift register.  The shift register was similar to the one presented in the previous 
example of the crypto core.  Even though this example was previously tested, it was important to 
if TrojanCounter(31) = '1' then 
 SER_OUT <= "1"; 
else 
 SER_OUT <= BUF(0); 
end if; 
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test it in a larger design in order to guarantee the identification of the malicious logic when there 
were significantly more entities to analyze.  The shift register was inserted in the data core entity 
of the design and was intended to leak data from memory to an attacker.  The port mapping of 
the Trojan shift register can be seen in Figure 31 below. 
 
Figure 31:  Trojan Shift Register Port Map 
As the VHDL code shows, the RDAT signal of the data core was leaked to the shift 
register and therefore leaked to an attacker.  The Trojan shift register’s internal characteristics 
are the same as the previous example’s shift register’s characteristics.  The shift register entity 
does not contain an output and was used as additional logic designed to leak the input 
information.  The Trojan shift register was detected using the same algorithms as before.  It was 
analyzed and found to contain no outputs, and therefore was marked as additional logic that 
could be utilized by a malicious attacker to leak information. 
4.4  Analysis 
As the previous sections noted, the Golden Reference Library matching as well as the 
Trojan detection methods produced successful results.  The matching methodology was 
subjected to numerous rounds of testing to determine its ability to match an unknown design to a 
functionality successfully.  Before specific assets were developed, the matching results were 
occasionally incorrect when dealing with general assets.  However, after incorporating the 
specific assets, the matching methodology was successful in matching an unknown design to a 
functionality.  Additionally, the output report of the percentage match gives the user an 
--Trojan Shift Register 
ShiftRegister: TSC 
Port Map(clk => CLK_I, 
   rst => CLR, 
   data_leak => RDAT, 
  Tj_Trig => tjTrigger); 
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indication of the other designs that matched closely in the case of an outlier as well as presenting 
the user with the average match of a functionality.  These provide the user with additional 
information that can assist in the evaluation of an unknown design.  Overall, the matching 
methodology is very successful in evaluating unknown designs due to the specificity of asset 
assignment and the large GRL used in comparison. 
Additionally, the Trojan detection portion of the project successfully analyzes unknown 
designs for potential Trojans.  As the previous sections have described, the Trust-Hub 
benchmarks were the major source of verification for the Trojan detection methods.  After 
implementing Trojan detection methods for all the Trojans found in the benchmarks, additional 
test vehicles were developed to illustrate the effectiveness of the remaining Trojan detection 
methods.  Finally, the Trojan detection methods were tested using large designs to ensure that 
Trojans could still be identified.  During all of the testing phases, the Trojan detection methods 
successfully identified the entire set of Trojans.  Therefore, the false negative rate for the Trojan 
detection methods was 0%. 
A limitation of the matching methodology involves matching a large design with many 
level of hierarchy.  Large designs incorporate internal signals mapped to lower level instances 
and the internal signals do not receive external assets during the asset assignment phase.  
Therefore, as the internal signals are connected to lower levels of the hierarchy, the asset pattern 
of the lower level entities includes the assets of signals that were not assigned an external asset.  
Additionally, the asset assignment at the top level of a design often requires more general assets 
since the signal at the top level is mapped to multiple lower level entities.  The result of these 
issues is that the functionality assignment of the lowest level entities is not as accurate as entities 
higher in the hierarchy of the design. 
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Although the Trojan detection methodology accurately identifies the Trojans with a false 
negative rate of zero, the Trojan detection methods consist of a non-zero false positive rate.  The 
ultimate goal of the Trojan detection methods was to produce a false negative rate of zero and in 
that respect the Trojan detection methods were successful.  In order to allow a false negative rate 
of zero, the false positive rate was non-zero.  However, the false positive rate is not a significant 
hindrance in determining the location of Trojans.  Additionally, the false positive rate for the 
Trojan detection varied among the individual Trojan detection methods. The overall final false 
positive rate for all Trojan detection methods is 4.4%. 
Of the set of Trojan detection method false positives, certain false positives were to be 
expected and are due to the nature of the Trojan detection methods.  First of all, the limitations of 
the parser cause occasional false positives to occur in Trojan detection methods involving the use 
of internal assets.  Certain VHDL syntax cannot be recognized by the parser in order to assign 
appropriate internal assets to the signal.  For example, the use of the “when” keyword in a 
concurrent statement cannot be recognized by the parser.  An example of this type of VHDL 
statement can be seen in Figure 32 below. 
 
Figure 32:  VHDL Concurrent Statements 
In the statement above, the WR signal ideally should receive a conditionally driving asset 
since it is used to determine the outputs WR_0 and WR_1.  However, the parser does not 
recognize signals found in the condition of the “when” statement resulting in no internal assets 
assigned to the WR signal.  Therefore, detection methods that involve analyzing the internal 
assets of a signal, such as the denial of service methods, are susceptible to attacks involving the 
“when” statements that are not identified by the parser.  Since the priority of the Trojan detection 
WR_0  <= '1' when (WR = '1' and ADR(15 downto 12) = "0000"  ) else '0'; 
WR_1  <= '1' when (WR = '1' and ADR(15 downto 12) = "0001"  ) else '0'; 
 74 
process was to ensure a zero false negative rate, the Trojan detection methods assumed a worst-
case scenario.  The result is that the false negative rate is indeed zero, but the false positive rate 
incurs a penalty. 
Additionally, some Trojan detection methods incur a larger false positive rate because of 
how the detection method is implemented.  Some of the Trojan detection methods are treated as 
warnings against possible malicious intentions by attackers rather than certainties of a Trojan 
insertion.  For example, one of the FSM Trojan detection methods identifies FSMs that are 
vulnerable to Trojan insertion at the gate level.  Even if no attack occurs at the gate level, this 
Trojan detection method identifies the potential for a Trojan to be inserted.  The driving 
objective behind these Trojan detection methods, as has been stated frequently, is identifying all 
Trojans in the design.  Therefore, some of the Trojan detection methods, such as the FSM 
method mentioned, present the user with the possibility that a Trojan could have been inserted.  
The Trojan detection report allows the user to quickly identify the locations of the potential 
Trojans and determine the validity of the detection method. 
Determining the false positive rate of the Trojan detection methods requires finding all 
false positives within the sample space then dividing this number by the sum of the false 
positives and the true negatives.  The true negatives are the cases when the Trojan detection 
methods correctly identified the absence of a Trojan.  There was a range of false positive rates 
found among the Trojan detection methods.  Some Trojan detection methods received a 0% false 
positive rate as no false positives had been detected.  The highest false positive rate found among 
the Trojan detection method was the time bomb counter detection method, which received a 20% 
false positive rate.  While this number is high, the Trojan detection method was designed to 
identify all Trojans, necessitating the presence of false positives.  Additionally, this Trojan 
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detection method, along with other detection methods that have a high false positive rate, would 
require analyzing the intention for a signal, which is very difficult to perform.  Consequently, the 
false positive rates for these types of Trojans are higher than others that are more distinctly 
malicious.  Therefore, for the Trojans with higher false positive rates, the user is required to 
analyze the design further to determine whether a Trojan has actually been inserted.  When all of 
the false positive rates were averaged together, the previously presented value of 4.4% was 
determined as the overall false positive rate. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
5.1  Summary 
The objectives presented at the outset were successfully attained throughout the course of 
the project.  The number of assets was significantly increased in order to provide greater 
diversity to asset patterns.  Furthermore, a Golden Reference Library and functionality matching 
methodology were created, allowing an unknown design to be analyzed and matched to a known 
design.  Finally, hardware Trojan detection methods were introduced to the Structural Checking 
methodology by utilizing the Golden Reference Library matching as well as analyzing internal 
characteristics of a hardware design.  Each of these key objectives was implemented and 
thoroughly tested. 
This project provides significant progress in the area of hardware Trojan detection, 
specifically with regard to the Structural Checking methodology.  Within the larger realm of 
hardware Trojan detection, this methodology detects very small hardware Trojans, a limitation of 
many other hardware Trojan detection methods.  Additionally, by using this methodology, 
hardware Trojans are detected pre-fabrication, saving IC design companies the significant cost of 
testing for hardware Trojans.  With respect to the Structural Checking methodology, this project 
has increased the capabilities of asset assignment as well as introduced the implementation of the 
completely new features of a Golden Reference Library and hardware Trojan detection. 
5.2  Future Work 
Several steps can be taken in order to further improve the Structural Checking 
methodology.  First, as more trusted designs are analyzed, the asset patterns associated with 
these designs can be added to the GRL.  This allows for the matching methodology to be more 
robust as more designs are added.  Additionally, as more Trojan attacks are discovered, 
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corresponding Trojan detection methods can be developed to identify these attacks.  
Additionally, the Trojan detection methods currently being used can be modified to further 
reduce the false positive rate associated with each method.  Finally, additional steps can be taken 
to better match lower level entities of large designs to a functionality. 
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